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MENS REA REFORM AND ITS
DISCONTENTS
BENJAMIN LEVIN*
This Article examines the contentious debates over recent proposals
for “mens rea reform.” The substantive criminal law has expanded
dramatically, and legislators have criminalized a great deal of conduct that
is quite common. Often, new criminal laws do not require that defendants
know they are acting unlawfully. Mens rea reform proposals seek to
address the problems of overcriminalization and unintentional offending by
increasing the burden on prosecutors to prove a defendant’s culpable
mental state. These proposals have been a staple of conservative-backed
bills on criminal justice reform. Many on the left remain skeptical of mens
rea reform and view it as a deregulatory vehicle purely designed to protect
defendants accused of financial or environmental crimes. Rather than
advocating for or against such proposals, this Article argues that
opposition to mens rea reform should trouble scholars and activists who
are broadly committed to criminal justice reform. Specifically, I argue that
the opposition demonstrates three particular pathologies of the U.S.
criminal system and U.S. criminal justice reform: (1) an overreliance on
criminal law as a vehicle for addressing social problems; (2) the instinct to
equalize or level up—when faced with inequality, many commentators
frequently argue that the privileged defendant should be treated as poorly
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as the disadvantaged defendant, rather than using the privileged
defendant’s treatment as a model; and (3) the temptation for mass
incarceration critics to make exceptions and support harsh treatment for
particularly unsympathetic defendants. Ultimately, this Article argues that
achieving sweeping and transformative criminal justice reform will require
overcoming the three pathologies.
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INTRODUCTION
In an era of intense partisan gridlock, criminal justice reform has
become a rare area that promises at least some slight space for
compromise.1 Indeed, recent years have seen a number of bipartisan bills
1 See, e.g., Eric Holder, Remarks at the National Press Club, 27 FED. SENT. R. 297, 299
(2015) (“[I]n the preliminary data we’ve seen—and the growing, bipartisan consensus
surrounding the work that’s underway—they prove unequivocally that criminal justice
reform is an idea whose time has finally come.”); Rachel E. Barkow & Mark
Osler, Designed to Fail: The President’s Deference to the Department of Justice in
Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 387, 390 (2017) (describing
“a bipartisan call to reform this state of affairs”); Heather Schoenfeld, A Research Agenda
on Reform: Penal Policy and Politics Across the States, 664 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 155, 162 (2016); Alex Altman, Criminal Justice Reform is Becoming
Washington’s Bipartisan Cause, TIME (Feb. 19, 2015), http://time.com/3714876/criminal-
justice-reform-is-becoming-washingtons-bipartisan-cause [https://perma.cc/ZV42-99BT].
But see Benjamin Levin, The Consensus Myth in Criminal Justice Reform, 117 MICH. L.
REV. 259, 263, 266–67 (2018) (critiquing the “bipartisan consensus”); Douglas A. Berman,
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introduced at the national level that, if passed, would take steps towards
addressing structural issues in the administration of criminal law.2 But
compromise has not been without its challenges, and efforts at sweeping
reform repeatedly have died on the cutting room floor.3
It is easy to imagine a range of potential sticking points in the effort to
forge a bipartisan consensus: the extent to which social and economic
programs should be a part of the legislation; how to treat “violent” crime;
how much to spend on programs for incarcerated people or people with
criminal records; what role questions of racial justice should play; and what
prison sentences should be viewed as excessive. But one major obstacle on
the road to federal criminal justice reform has been an unexpected one:
mens rea reform.4 Mens rea—a key component of the substantive criminal
law and a staple of the first-year law school curriculum is the requirement
that criminal conduct be accompanied by a “bad mind” or guilty mental
state.5
Mens rea operates as a tricky issue of proof in many cases and when
dealing with many statutes. Was a defendant malicious or negligent when
she committed homicide? Did a defendant know that she was transporting
heroin in her car, or was she merely reckless? But, judges, defendants, and
Is It Really True that “Conservatives and Liberals Are Increasingly United”




2 See, e.g., Michael Serota, Proportional Mens Rea and the Future of Criminal Code
Reform, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1201, 1221 (2017); Honorable Patti B. Saris, A
Generational Shift for Federal Drug Sentences, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 15 (2015); Jordain
Carney, Senators to Reintroduce Bipartisan Criminal Justice Bill, THE HILL, Sept. 19, 2017,
available at https://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/351471-senators-to-reintroduce-
bipartisan-criminal-justice-bill [https://perma.cc/5CTM-E9HF]; Lee Rawles, ABA Urges
Senate Action on Bipartisan Sentencing Reform Bill, A.B.A. J., Jan. 9, 2018, available at
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/aba_urges_action_on_bipartisan_sentencing_refor
m_bill_before_the_senate [https://perma.cc/CKU2-WBTA].
3 See, e.g., C.J. Ciaramella, The Senate Will Try Again On Sentencing Reform This Year,
REASON (Oct. 4, 2017), http://reason.com/blog/2017/10/04/the-senate-will-try-again-on-
sentencing [https://perma.cc/Z5GH-NGFR]; Carl Hulse, Why the Senate Couldn’t Pass a
Crime Bill Both Parties Backed, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2016, at A8.
4 See, e.g., Deborah W. Denno, Concocting Criminal Intent, 105 GEO. L.J. 323, 378
(2017) (collecting sources); Alexander F. Sarch, Beyond Willful Ignorance, 88 U. COLO. L.
REV. 97, 100 (2017) (collecting sources); Alex Sarch, How to Solve the Biggest Issue
Holding Up Criminal Justice Reform, POLITICO (May 16, 2016),
https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2016/05/criminal-justice-reform-mens-rea-middle-
ground-000120 [https://perma.cc/XR35-DZDH].
5 See generally Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 974–75 (1932)
(describing the critical role of mens rea in criminal law).
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prosecutors face particular problems when criminal statutes are silent as to
mens rea—i.e., when a statute fails to specify what mental state a defendant
possessed.6 Does silence mean that the legislature intended to impose strict
liability? Or should courts view silence as the result of sloppy drafting and
read in some sort of mental state requirement? Reform would alter the
existing federal criminal code by imposing a default mental state for all
crimes. Congress still could pass strict liability criminal statutes, but those
statutes would need to be explicit about the strict liability provisions.
So, why have these reform proposals generated such controversy and
taken on such an important role in federal criminal justice reform policy?
Certainly, mens rea is an important concept in criminal law,7 and, legal
scholars have devoted countless pages to examining the proper role of mens
rea in assessing culpability and crafting criminal statutes.8 But it is not an
issue that has cropped up frequently in the growing public conversation
about criminal justice reform. Questions about a defendant’s mental state
appear to have very little to do with concerns about racial disparities, police
violence, or structural inequality. As protestors have taken to the streets
and as editorial pages have filled with calls for fixing a broken system,
6 See, e.g., Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 606 (1994) (outlining rules of
construction that courts might adopt when faced with statutory silence as to mens rea);
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 600
n. 276 (2001) (describing the importance of specifying a mental state).
7 See, e.g., Elizabeth Papp Kamali, Felonia Felonice Facta: Felony and Intentionality in
Medieval England, 9 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 397, 398–99 (2015); Jeffrey S. Parker, The
Economics of Mens Rea, 79 VA. L. REV. 741, 741–42 (1993) (“[M]ens rea plainly
dominates in the legal determination whether an injurious act will be subject to criminal
sanctions . . . .”); Sayre, supra note 5, at 974 (“No problem of criminal law is of more
fundamental importance or has proved more baffling through the centuries than the
determination of the precise mental element or mens rea.”); Kenneth W. Simons, Should the
Model Penal Code’s Mens Rea Provisions Be Amended?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 179, 179
(2003) (identifying the clarification of mental state categories as the “MPC’s greatest
achievement”).
8 See, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate
Criminal Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1106 (1991); Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules
and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 646
(1984); Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 22–23 (1994); Sanford
H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 257, 260–61 (1987); Sanford H.
Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine, 73 CALIF.
L. REV. 323, 349 (1985); Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element Analysis in Defining
Criminal Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681, 685–705
(1983); Francis Bowes Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Another, 43 HARV. L.
REV. 689, 721 (1930); Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463,
463 (1992).
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mens rea reform has hardly been the rallying cry, or even an afterthought.9
Yet mens rea reform proposals have taken on outsized significance as the
latest stumbling block in the effort to address an unwieldy and seemingly
limitless federal criminal system.10 Among conservatives and libertarians,
mens rea reform has become a key component of legislative efforts: the
proliferation of laws that criminalize conduct even if defendants are
unaware that they are acting unlawfully stands as a powerful illustration of
big government and over-regulation run amok.11 For liberals, progressives,
and many on the left, however, mens rea reform is not responsive to the real
problems with criminal law: Republican proposals would serve
deregulatory ends and make it harder to prosecute corporate, financial, or
environmental crime, but the proposals would do little to address the plight
of the poor people of color who make up a disproportionate part of the
carceral population.12
This Article examines the debate over proposed mens rea legislation as
a means of better understanding the contemporary criminal justice reform
movement (or moment) and its limitations. With an eye to the relationship
9 See, e.g., MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES, Platform, A Vision for Black Lives,
https://policy.m4bl.org/platform/ [https://perma.cc/PSM2-K85Y] (outlining the reforms
demanded by the Movement for Black Lives).
10 See, e.g., Mike Debonis, The Issue That Could Keep Congress From Passing Criminal
Justice Reform, WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
powerpost/wp/2016/01/20/the-issue-that-could-keep-congress-from-passing-criminal-
justice-reform/?utm_term=.3592d664b67c [https://perma.cc/N2QD-J6XE] (discussing “a
narrow but crucial issue that has emerged as the main political obstacle to a criminal justice
reform bill: to what degree prosecutors must prove a defendant’s criminal intent in order to
win convictions for certain federal crimes”); Paul J. Hofer, A Change Election, 29 FED.
SENT. R. 69, 71, (2017) (describing mens rea reform proposals as “stumbling blocks for
reaching bipartisan legislative consensus”).
11 See, e.g., Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Regulation, Prohibition, and Overcriminalization: The
Proper and Improper Uses of the Criminal Law, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 745, 757 (2014); John
G. Malcolm, Criminal Justice Reform at the Crossroads, 20 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 249, 272
(2016) (“One of the greatest safeguards against overcriminalization–the misuse and overuse
of criminal laws and penalties to address societal problems–is ensuring that there is an
adequate mens rea requirement in criminal laws.”).
12 See Carl Takei, From Mass Incarceration to Mass Control, and Back Again: How
Bipartisan Criminal Justice Reform May Lead to a For-Profit Nightmare, 20 U. PA. J.L. &
SOC. CHANGE 125, 169 (2017) (collecting sources). Contemporary left critiques of mass
incarceration and the carceral state certainly vary, but they tend to foreground questions of
distributive justice across various axes of power and marginalization. See generally
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS (2010); JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA (2017); LOÏC WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE
NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL INSECURITY (2009); BRUCEWESTERN, PUNISHMENT
AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (2006).
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between criminal law and broader questions of political economy, I argue
that the debate has much to tell us about the limits of criminal justice
reform and the continued reliance on criminalization as a means of solving
social problems. This Article explores the terms of the debate and reveals
the fault lines that lurk below—and threaten to upset—the movement. I
argue that the split on mens rea reform is not simply a left or right
disagreement about regulated markets and the welfare state; it also reveals
disagreements on the political left about the nature of the state and the
proper role of criminal law and incarceration in efforts to advance equality
and curb the abuses of capital. Where a long line of literature has explained
mass incarceration as the exclusive product of tough-on-crime
conservatism,13 this Article joins a small but growing literature that
examines left complicity in—and sometimes support for—the policies that
built the carceral state.14
To be clear at the outset, I am not advocating for or against mens rea
reform legislation as a desirable component of a broader package of
criminal justice reform policies. Rather, I hope to demonstrate how the
debate over mens rea reform—and, particularly, opposition to it from the
political left—illustrates deeper pathologies in U.S. criminal policy.
Recognizing these pathologies need not compel a specific policy outcome.
But it should force reform opponents to recognize the distributional costs of
continued reliance on a criminal regulatory model.15 And, perhaps more
importantly, it should force opponents to recognize the place of mens rea
13 See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 12; MICHAEL W. FLAMM, LAW AND ORDER:
STREET CRIME, CIVIL UNREST, AND THE CRISIS OF LIBERALISM IN THE 1960S, 31–50
(2005); Harry A. Chernoff et. al., The Politics of Crime, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 527, 527–38
(1996).
14 See, e.g., LIBBY ADLER, GAY PRIORI: A QUEER CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
APPROACH TO LAW REFORM (2018); FORMAN, supra note 12; AYA GRUBER, THE FEMINIST
WAR ON CRIME (unpublished manuscript) (source on file with author); NAOMI
MURAKAWA, THE FIRST CIVIL RIGHT: HOW LIBERALS BUILT PRISON AMERICA (2014). Cf.
Karen Engle, Anti-Impunity and the Turn to Criminal Law in Human Rights, 100 CORNELL
L. REV. 1069, 1127 (2015) (taking “a critical look at the implications of connecting human
rights remedies to criminal law”).
15 Describing the costs of opposing mens rea reform does not mean denying that there
might be benefits. Indeed, for some of the left critics I discuss, the proper policy
determination might rest on such an analysis of mens rea reform bills and their
consequences. Cf. Aya Gruber, When Theory Met Practice: Distributional Analysis in
Critical Criminal Law Theorizing, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3211 (2015) (describing this
approach); Prabha Kotiswaran, Born Unto Brothels - Toward A Legal Ethnography of Sex
Work in an Indian Red-Light Area, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 579 (2008) (applying a
distributional analysis); Jorge L. Esquirol, Legal Latin Americanism, 16 YALE HUM. RTS. &
DEV. L.J. 145, 161 (2013) (describing distributional analysis as “a popular form of critical
analysis by legal progressives in the U.S.”).
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reform debates within the broader constellation of criminal policymaking
and criminal justice reform. At its core, my claim is that meaningful
change in the criminal system will require different groups and interests to
move beyond criminalization and incarceration when they confront bad
actors or bad conduct. It is easy to talk about reform, reducing sentences,
or decriminalization in the abstract. It is much more difficult to embrace a
decarceral posture when dealing with specific cases or specific conduct that
one views as particularly pernicious.
This Article uses left and center-left opposition to mens rea reform as
a way of appreciating the stickiness or intractability of “governing through
crime.”16 To this end, my argument unfolds in four Parts: Part I briefly
explains the broader context for mens rea reform proposals. I situate mens
rea reform proposals within a discourse on overcriminalization and against
the backdrop of strict liability offenses as a growing portion of the criminal
code. Next, Part II introduces the statutory framework of mens rea reform,
describes the recent legislative proposals, and shows how mens rea reform
would work and how it might affect individual case outcomes. Part III
tracks the debate over mens rea reform. In this Part, I examine both the
sources of progressive opposition as well as core disagreements about the
relationship between the carceral state and the regulatory state.
Finally, Part IV steps back to discuss the broader significance of these
debates and why opposition to mens rea reform displays the shortcomings
of progressive commitments to decarceration and criminal justice reform.
In this Part, I identify three core pathologies of U.S. criminal policy and
argue that opposition to mens rea reform reflects each of them: (1) a
commitment to using criminal law as the default regulatory model; (2) a
tendency to level up when faced with inequality (i.e., to punish the
powerful defendant more, rather than punishing the powerless defendant
less); and (3) the temptation for mass incarceration critics to make
exceptions and support harsh treatment for particularly unsympathetic
defendants. To be clear, my claim is not that mens rea reform meaningfully
addresses deeper structural flaws in the criminal system or that these
bipartisan bills are without flaws. Rather, my claim is that the opposition
marks a troubling inability to step outside of the criminalization paradigm.
I conclude by arguing for a more capacious vision of criminal justice
reform that would reject criminalization and incarceration as desirable
vehicles for advancing social justice.
16 See JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME
TRANSFORMEDAMERICANDEMOCRACY AND CREATED ACULTURE OF FEAR 17 (2007).
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I. THE CONTEXT OFMENS REAREFORM
The academic literature on mens rea reform generally skirts the
distributional questions at the heart of conversations about mass
incarceration.17 This literature—unlike much contemporary criminal justice
scholarship—frequently avoids issues of social marginalization, race, or
structural inequality and instead focuses on questions of moral culpability,
“rule of law”, and “neutral” legal principles.18 A primary goal of this
Article is to reframe or reconsider debates about mens rea reform through
the broader lens of mass incarceration, considering the distributional
consequences of the proposals and their opposition. But, before stepping
back to this larger frame, this Part situates mens rea reform in the context of
the literatures from which it has grown: (1) the opposition to
overcriminalization; and (2) the historical hostility to the use of strict
liability in criminal law.
A. OVERCRIMINALIZATION
Everything is a crime, and everyone is a criminal. (Well, almost.)
That has become the refrain among a growing chorus of critics who decry
the phenomenon of “overcriminalization.”19 Overcriminalization—the
over- or mis-use of criminal law20—was first diagnosed by Sanford Kadish
in the 1960s and has remained a topic of scholarly inquiry for the last fifty
years.21 Initially, the critique generally enjoyed traction on the civil
libertarian left, where scholars identified morals legislation as a product of
conservatism run amok; over time, though, the critique attracted voices on
17 See Part III.A., infra.
18 See Part III.A., infra.
19 See generally DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW (2008); HARVEY A. SILVERGLATE, THREE FELONIES A DAY: HOW THE
FEDS TARGET THE INNOCENT (2009); Andrew Ashworth, Conceptions of
Overcriminalization, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 407 (2008); Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces
of Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U.
L. REV. 747 (2005); Jennifer M. Chacón, Overcriminalizing Immigration, 102 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 613 (2012); Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L.
REV. 703 (2005); William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive
Fourth Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842 (2001); Sanford H. Kadish, Legal Norm and
Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Processes, 75 HARV. L. REV. 904, 909 (1962).
20 While the term is used frequently, its definition remains a point of some contention.
See generally Levin, supra note 1 (offering alternate definitions).
21 See Erik Luna, Prosecutorial Decriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
785, 785 (2012) (citing Sanford H. Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and
Sentencing Processes, 75 HARV. L. REV. 904, 909 (1962)) (“As far as I can tell, Sanford
Kadish coined the term “overcriminalization” in a 1962 article in the Harvard Law
Review . . . .”).
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the right, which focused on regulatory crimes as illustrations of big
government and the regulatory state gone wild.22 In various forms, the
overcriminalization critique has achieved substantial purchase not only in
the academy but among a range of attorneys and policymakers.23
The push for mens rea reform has grown out of the literature on
overcriminalization—when too much conduct is criminalized, the argument
goes, we need to come up with a way of imposing checks on state power.24
When it is so easy to commit a crime unknowingly, something must be
amiss. If criminal law is supposed to punish conduct that is morally
culpable, isn’t it a problem when people are punished when they had no
reason to believe they were doing anything wrong?25 In introducing the
Mens Rea Reform Act of 2017, Senator Orrin Hatch made the link to
overcriminalization explicit:
Rampant and unfair overcriminalization in America calls for criminal justice reform,
which starts with default mens rea legislation . . . . Requiring proof of criminal intent
22 See generally Levin, supra note 1. Thanks to David Sklansky for highlighting this
shift over time.
23 See, e.g., Defining the Problem and Scope of Over-Criminalization and Over-
Federalization: Hearing Before the Over-Criminalization Task Force of 2013 of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013); Reining in Overcriminalization: Assessing the
Problem, Proposing Solutions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010); Over-Criminalization
of Conduct/Over-Federalization of Criminal Law: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009);
NAT’L ASSOC. OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, Overcriminalization,
http://www.nacdl.org/overcrim/ [http://perma.cc/ZD64-6ZJ4] (last visited Jul. 6, 2017); THE
HERITAGE FOUNDATION, Overcriminalization, http://www.heritage.org/issues/
legal/overcriminalization [http://perma.cc/2WVG-NLZX], (last visited June 12, 2018);
RIGHT ON CRIME, Overcriminalization http://rightoncrime.com/category/priorityissues/
overcriminalization/ (last visited June 12, 2018); TEXAS PUBLIC POLICY FOUNDATION,
Overcriminalization, http://old.texaspolicy.com/issues/overcriminalization [http://perma.cc/
P4DX-PP6C] (last visited July 6, 2017); Task Force on Overcriminalization, ABA,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/initiatives/overcriminalization.html
[http://perma.cc/P5DY-9BWK] (last visited July 6, 2017).
24 See, e.g., Stephen F. Smith, Overcoming Overcriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 537, 574 (2012) (describing the need for mens rea reform as a means of
countering overcriminalization and “overzealousness of federal prosecutors”); Shon
Hopwood, Clarity in Criminal Law, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 695, 699 (2017); David Thaw,
Criminalizing Hacking, Not Dating: Reconstructing the CFAA Intent Requirement, 103 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 907, 945 (2013); John Villasenor, Over-Criminalization and
Mens Rea Reform: A Primer, BROOKINGS: FIXGOV BLOG (Dec. 22, 2015),
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/fixgov/posts/2015/12/22-mens-rea-reform-villasenor
[http://perma.cc/PM44-9TRE].
25See Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 107, 109
(“[T]o punish conduct without reference to the actor’s state of mind is both inefficacious and
unjust.”).
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protects individuals from prison time or other criminal penalties for accidental
conduct or for activities they didn’t know were wrong. In recent years, Congress and
federal agencies have increasingly created crimes with vague or unclear criminal
intent requirements or with no criminal intent requirement at all. The Mens Rea
Reform Act will help correct that problem . . . .26
Drawing on the historical role of mens rea, Stephen Smith similarly
has argued that mens rea reform should be a critical component of
addressing the scourge of overcriminalization.27 In Smith’s account, the
absence of express mental state requirements not only erodes necessary
gradations of proportionality and moral blame; the silence and lack of
clarity also are “troubling because mens rea requirements are an essential
safeguard against unjust convictions and disproportionate punishment.”28
According to this line of critique, an adequate (and explicit) mental
state requirement is one of “the greatest safeguards
against overcriminalization.” 29 Or as Representative Bobby Scott put it,
“without these protective elements in our criminal laws, honest citizens are
at risk of being victimized and criminalized by poorly crafted legislation
and overzealous prosecutors.”30 The concern here, as in other corners of
overcriminalization literature, is that criminal laws are extremely broad and
reach a great deal of conduct; without clear terms and without internal
checks, too much power is placed in the hands of prosecutors (and, by
extension, the state).31 In Without Intent: How Congress Is Eroding the
26 Press Release, U.S. Senator Orrin Hatch, Senators Hatch, Lee, Cruz, Perdue, and Paul
Introduce Bill to Strengthen Criminal Intent Protections (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.
lee.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2017/10/senators-hatch-lee-cruz-perdue-and-paul-introduce-
bill-to-strength-criminal-intent-protections [http://perma.cc/3AUP-TWDE].
27 See Smith, supra note 24, at 568.
28 Id.
29 Malcolm, supra note 11, at 272.
30 Mens Rea: The Need for a Meaningful Intent Requirement in Federal Criminal Law:
Hearing Before the Over-Criminalization Task Force of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
113th Cong. (2013), at 3.
31 See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Prosecutors and Overcriminalization: Thoughts on
Political Dynamics and A Doctrinal Response, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 453, 453 (2009)
(“We know prosecutors take advantage of overcriminalization.”); Lisa Kern
Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 311, 382 (2007) (collecting sources); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S.
CALIF. L. REV. 1313, 1354 (2012) (describing the “‘overcriminalization’ framework” as “a
diverse body of work that explains how the substantive criminal law has ceded its power
over outcomes to police and prosecutorial discretion”); Ellen S.
Podgor, Overcriminalization: The Politics of Crime, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 541, 542 (2005)
(“[O]vercriminalization can be a function of both increased legislation and also the
application of existing legislation through prosecutorial discretion . . . .”); Zachary S.
Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 679 (2014)
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Criminal Intent Requirement in Federal Law, a 2010 report by the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the Heritage Foundation,
mens rea reform is framed as an important antidote to the interwoven
problems of overcriminalization and prosecutorial discretion:
Prosecutorial discretion plays an important role in the American criminal justice
system . . . . But a criminal offense should never be so broad, or its mens rea
requirements so lax, that it allows prosecutors to obtain convictions of persons who
are not truly blameworthy and who did not have fair notice of possible criminal
responsibility.32
The absence of clear mens rea requirements, therefore, exacerbates the
already-troubling dynamics of an expansive criminal code enforced by
prosecutors able to leverage their almost-unchecked power and discretion.
In other words, we can understand mens rea reform as a vehicle for
reining in criminal law and addressing the problem of overcriminalization.33
Or, more specifically, mens rea reform might operate as a vehicle for
returning criminal law to its proper scope—that is, if we can agree on the
proper scope of criminal law. The literature on overcriminalization
assumes (either explicitly or implicitly) that there is a proper scope for
criminal law and that the legislature has overreached,34 but decades of
scholarship and policy debate indicate that not everyone can agree on what
conduct criminal law should reach.35 Nevertheless, the case for mens rea
(describing the “vast literature” that “addresses prosecutorial discretion and the related
problem of overcriminalization”).
32 BRIAN W. WALSH & TIFFANY M. JOSLYN, WITHOUT INTENT: HOW CONGRESS IS
ERODING THE CRIMINAL INTENT REQUIREMENT IN FEDERAL LAW 29 (2010).
33 See, e.g., C. Jarrett Dieterle, The Lacey Act: A Case Study in the Mechanics of
Overcriminalization, 102 GEO. L.J. 1279, 1305 (2014); RIGHT ON CRIME, Overcrimina
lization, http://rightoncrime.com/category/priorityissues/overcriminalization/ [http://perma.c
c/3MEZ-55FF] (last visited June 12, 2018) (identifying “[e]nsur[ing] that an appropriate
culpable mental state is included in the elements of all offenses” as a “conservative solution”
to overcriminalization); Press Release, U.S. Senator Orrin Hatch, Senators Hatch, Lee, Cruz,
Perdue, and Paul Introduce Bill to Strengthen Criminal Intent Protections (Oct. 2, 2017)
https://www.lee.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2017/10/senators-hatch-lee-cruz-perdue-and-
paul-introduce-bill-to-strength-criminal-intent-protections [http://perma.cc/T5NT-UKGN]
(“Rampant and unfair overcriminalization in America calls for criminal justice reform,
which starts with default mens rea legislation.”).
34 See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The Accelerating Degradation of
American Criminal Codes, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 633, 634 (2005) (“[I]t has become clear that
most legislatures no longer use their criminal law codification power to promote broad and
useful change, but have become ‘offense factories’ churning out more and more narrow,
unnecessary, and often counterproductive new offenses.”).
35 The question of a proper baseline haunts discussions of overcriminalization and
criminal policy, generally—without an agreement on the proper scope of criminal law and
criminal punishment, critiques of too much criminal law tend to assume what they set out to
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reform rests at least in part on the belief that a culpable mental state should
be a critical component of acceptable or legitimate criminal statutes.
Notably, in this framing, the focus of reformers is on helping
defendants who are either innocent or, at least, not morally culpable. The
majority of the discourse on overcriminalization implies both that there is a
proper scope for criminal law and that there is some class of defendants
who is deserving of punishment.36 And, as discussed in Part III, this line of
argument might well risk legitimating the treatment of a range of
defendants charged with crimes that don’t fit into the class of offenses
frequently identified with overcriminalization.37
I soon will return to the arguments marshalled in support of mens rea
reform. But, before examining the specific proposals in the next Part, it is
important to recognize the historical context of mens rea reform. The
movement to re-invigorate mental state requirements does not simply draw
from the rhetoric of overcriminalization. Indeed, overcriminalization critics
identify a range of structural flaws and policy solutions that have little to do
with mental states: to some, the problem is the criminalization of
“victimless” or “harmless” conduct;38 to others, the problem is the use of
criminal law to reinforce morality;39 to others, the problem is the use of
criminal law where a civil sanction or regulatory measure might do the
prove and fail to provide a normative framework against which to weigh criminalization
efforts. See, e.g., JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS
INCARCERATION AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 8 (2017) (“Part of the problem is
that no one has provided a metric for determining how many people in prison is “too
many” . . . .”); Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 109, 193–94 (1999) (arguing that an attempt to use the harm principle to
restrict the scope of criminal law will fail because of the principle’s indeterminacy); Smith,
supra note 24, at 538 (“It is, of course, difficult to make such claims without a normative
baseline—an idea of what constitutes the ‘right’ number of criminal laws—and such a
baseline is elusive at best.”).
36 See generally Part III, infra.
37 This critique might be applied more generally to reform efforts that foreground
wrongful convictions and innocent defendants. See generally Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M.
Steiker, The Seduction of Innocence: The Attraction and Limitations of the Focus on
Innocence in Capital Punishment Law and Advocacy, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 587
(2005).
38 See, e.g., MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME: THE USE AND
ABUSE OF VICTIMS’ RIGHTS (2002); Susan L. Pilcher, Ignorance, Discretion and the
Fairness of Notice: Confronting “Apparent Innocence” in the Criminal Law, 33 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1, 34 (1995).
39 See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and
Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 749 (2005); Green, supra note
39; Kimberly Thomas, Interpersonal Power in the Criminal System, 50 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 247, 276 (2013).
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trick.40 The push for mens rea reform draws from a specific strand of
overcriminalization literature that in turn draws from critical literature on
the role of strict liability in criminal law.
B. STRICT LIABILITY
Much ink has been spilled on the place of strict liability in criminal
law,41 and rehashing this literature is not necessary to understand the mens
rea reform debates, but to appreciate the fights over mens rea reform
requires us to recognize that the presence or absence of mental state
provisions in criminal statutes has long been a point of contention.
Writing in 1960, two years before Kadish introduced the term
“overcriminalization, Richard Wasserstrom observed that “[t]he history
of . . . strict liability offenses which are of legislative origin is of quite
recent date.”42 Despite (or, perhaps, because of) their novelty, Wasserstrom
framed strict liability offenses as the subject of widespread scholarly
criticism:
The proliferation of so-called “strict liability” offenses in the criminal law has
occasioned the vociferous, continued, and almost unanimous criticism of analysts and
philosophers of the law. The imposition of severe criminal sanctions in the absence of
40 See, e.g., Kip Schlegel, et al., Are White-Collar Crimes Overcriminalized? Some
Evidence on the Use of Criminal Sanctions Against Securities Violators, 28 W. ST. U. L.
REV. 117, 120 (2001) (“[O]vercriminalization represents the imposition of a criminal
sanction more frequently than merited given other social control responses that are
available . . . .”).
41 See, e.g., R.A. Duff, Strict Liability, Legal Presumptions, and the Presumption of
Innocence, in APPRAISING STRICT LIABILITY 125 (A.P. Simester, ed., 2005); Catherine L.
Carpenter, On Statutory Rape, Strict Liability, and the Public Welfare Offense Model,
53 AM. U. L. REV. 313, 314 (2003); Gary V. Dubin, Mens Rea Reconsidered: A Plea for A
Due Process Concept of Criminal Responsibility, 18 STAN. L. REV. 322, 324 (1966);
George P. Fletcher, The Fall and Rise of Criminal Theory, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 275, 280
(1998) (describing the relationship between theories of strict liability in tort and criminal
law); Aziz Z. Huq & Genevieve Lakier, Apparent Fault, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1525, 1534
(2018); Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN.
L. REV. 591 (1981); Laurie L. Levenson, Good Faith Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability
Crimes, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 402 (1993) (“For years, courts and commentators have
struggled with the criminal strict liability doctrine.”); Stephen J. Morse, The Moral
Metaphysics of Causation and Results, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 879, 879 (2000) (“[V]irtually all
criminal law theorists agree that moral fault is at least a necessary condition of blame and
punishment . . . .”); Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55,
62 (1933); Amy J. Sepinwall, Faultless Guilt: Toward A Relationship-Based Account of
Criminal Liability, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 521, 522 (2017).
42 Richard A. Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L. REV. 731,
731 n.1 (1960).
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any requisite mental element has been held by many to be incompatible with the basic
requirements of our Anglo-American, and, indeed, any civilized jurisprudence.43
In other words, strict liability “is a doctrine that contradicts the most
basic principles of modern criminal law.”44
Where mens rea requirements reinforce a retributive vision of criminal
law (i.e., punishment should match moral culpability), strict liability
offenses accord with a range of utilitarian approaches to criminal law.45
Over the course of the twentieth century, the rise of strict liability statutes in
the United States confounded courts and commentators uncertain of when
and how statutory silence was meant to be interpreted.46 Some of this
uncertainty simply reflected the challenges of statutory interpretation: how
should a judge decide what the legislature intended?47 But, some of this
uncertainty (and some of the hostility from the bench and the academy)
appears to find root in a deeper theoretical objection: either a commitment
to retributivist principles,48 or a deep discomfort with the “regulatory”
functions of criminal law.49
43 Id. at 731 (internal citations omitted).
44 Levenson, supra note 41, at 402; see also Fowler v. Padget, 7 T.R. 509, 514 (K.B.
1798) (“[I]t is a principle of natural justice, and of our law, that actus non facit reum nisi
mens sit rea. The intent and the Act must both concur to constitute the crime . . . .”).
45 See Kenneth W. Simons, When Is Strict Criminal Liability Just?, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1075, 1075–76 (1997) (“The most vigorous condemnation of strict liability
in criminal law comes from retributivists, not from utilitarians. Strict liability appears to be a
straightforward case of punishing the blameless, an approach that might have consequential
benefits but is unfair on any retrospective theory of just deserts.”).
46 See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 254, n.14 (1952) (“Consequences of a
general abolition of intent as an ingredient of serious crimes have aroused the concern of
responsible and disinterested students of penology.”).
47 See, e.g., Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 153–54 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985); Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Law
Reform and the Persistence of Strict Liability, 62 DUKE L.J. 285, 293 (2012); John Shepard
Wiley Jr., Not Guilty by Reason of Blamelessness: Culpability in Federal Criminal
Interpretation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1021, 1026 (1999).
48 See, e.g., United States v. Int’l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565 (1971)
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (“This case stirs large questions—questions that go to the moral
foundations of the criminal law. Whether postulated as a problem of ‘mens rea,’ of
‘willfulness,’ of ‘criminal responsibility,’ or of ‘scienter,’ the infliction of criminal
punishment upon the unaware has long troubled the fair administration of justice.”); H.L.A.
HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 152 (1968) (“The reason why, according to
modern ideas, strict liability is odious, and appears as a sacrifice of a valued principle . . . is
that those whom we punish should have had, when they acted, the normal capacities . . . for
doing what the law requires and abstaining from what it forbids . . . .”).
49 See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 442–43 (1978); Paul J.
Larkin, Jr., Strict Liability Offenses, Incarceration, and the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1065, 1088 (2014) (“The criticism
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Confronted with the rising specter of strict liability statutes, the
Supreme Court grappled with when and how to read in an implied mens rea
requirement.50 On March 7, 1922, the Court heard two cases that raised the
question of whether statutory silence meant strict liability or implied some
mental state requirement: United States v. Balint51 and United States v.
Behrman.52 In Behrman, Morris Behrman, a doctor, had been prosecuted
for writing an unlawful prescription for an addicted patient in violation of
the Narcotic Drug Act of December 17, 1914.53 Behrman sought to take
advantage of a statutory exception because of his profession and because he
was unaware that the patient suffered from addiction.54 In Balint, a group
of defendants were prosecuted for violating the same Act by selling cocaine
and opium derivatives.55 Here, the defendants claimed that the indictment
was defective because it didn’t require proof that they knew they were
selling controlled substances.56
Both decisions came down on the same day. In Behrman, the Court
rejected the defendant’s arguments and concluded that “[i]f the offense be a
statutory one, and intent or knowledge is not made an element of it, the
indictment need not charge such knowledge or intent.”57 Balint similarly
led to a prosecution-friendly outcome and an expansive reading of the
statute.58 Here, the Court looked to legislative intent in order to conclude
that silence meant strict liability:
Its manifest purpose is to require every person dealing in drugs to ascertain at his peril
whether that which he sells comes within the inhibition of the statute, and if he sells
the inhibited drug in ignorance of its character, to penalize him. Congress weighed the
possible injustice of subjecting an innocent seller to a penalty against the evil of
exposing innocent purchasers to danger from the drug, and concluded that the latter
was the result preferably to be avoided. Doubtless considerations as to the opportunity
that strict liability offenses provide inadequate notice of criminal conduct is a particularly
cogent one today. Use of the criminal justice system to enforce federal regulatory programs
is heavily freighted with problems that do not arise when the only penalties at stake are
administrative or civil.”).
50 See MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, THE POLICE POWER: PATRIARCHY AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 147–53 (2005) (describing the Court’s
handling of so-called “public welfare” offenses).
51 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
52 258 U.S. 280 (1922).
53 Id. at 285–87.
54 See id.
55 See Balint, 258 U.S. at 251.
56 See id.
57 Behrman, 258 U.S. at 288.
58 See Balint, 258 U.S. at 253–54.
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of the seller to find out the fact and the difficulty of proof of knowledge contributed to
this conclusion.59
In short, the Court read the statute against the backdrop of a set of
regulatory concerns, and concluded that strict liability reflected a legislative
cost-benefit analysis, an analysis that the Court needn’t undertake.
United States v. Dotterweich,60 decided just over twenty years later,
continued that utilitarian theme and foreshadowed the use of strict liability
as a means of reaching corporate executives. Joseph Dotterweich, a
pharmaceutical executive, was prosecuted because his company allegedly
had shipped mislabeled and adulterated drugs in violation of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.61 As in the earlier cases, Dotterweich was
convicted under a strict liability standard.62 And, as in the earlier cases, the
Court declined to read in a mens rea requirement by nodding to legislative
intent and the utilitarian calculus of a new generation of regulatory or
“public welfare” crimes:
The purposes of this legislation thus touch phases of the lives and health of people
which, in the circumstances of modern industrialism, are largely beyond self-
protection. Regard for these purposes should infuse construction of the
legislation . . . . The prosecution to which Dotterweich was subjected is based on a
now familiar type of legislation whereby penalties serve as effective means of
regulation. Such legislation dispenses with the conventional requirement for criminal
conduct—awareness of some wrongdoing. In the interest of the larger good it puts the
burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in
responsible relation to a public danger.63
Once again, the role of criminal law as a social welfare mechanism
overrode traditional concerns with moral culpability.64
If Dotterweich were the last word on interpreting legislative silence in
criminal statutes, the story of mens rea reform might look very different.
Advocates might still argue for a default mental state, but the argument
would have to be couched in terms of an outright opposition to strict
liability; arguments about clarity, confusion, notice, and predictability
would hold no water, as it would be pretty clear that statutory silence meant
strict liability. But Morissette v. United States65 complicates the story.
Decided in 1952, the case involved a scrap metal dealer, Joseph Edward
59 Id. at 254.
60 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
61 Id. at 278.
62 See id.
63 Id. at 280–81.
64 See generally Part IV.A.
65 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952).
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Morissette, who found some used bomb casings on an Air Force bombing
range and sold the metal at a junk market.66 Morissette was prosecuted
under a statute that proscribed “knowingly” converting government
property.67 Morissette conceded that he had taken the shell casings and
done so knowingly, but argued that he didn’t know they were of value to
the government and therefore that he didn’t know he was “converting”
them.68 Unlike the earlier cases, the Morissette Court read “knowing” to
apply to all the elements of the offense, accepting the defendant’s reading
and rejecting the government’s call for strict liability.69 In distinguishing
this case from its earlier decisions, the Court explained that those cases
involved “public welfare offenses” (i.e., newer regulatory crimes defined by
a utilitarian focus on Progressive regulation), whereas Morissette’s alleged
offense resembled a common law crime (e.g., theft or larceny).70 For such
common law crimes, the Court reasoned, Congress was legislating against a
set of background understandings about mens rea requirements.71
Even the Court acknowledged the indeterminacy of the distinction it
had drawn:
Neither this Court nor, so far as we are aware, any other has undertaken to delineate a
precise line or set forth comprehensive criteria for distinguishing between crimes that
require a mental element and crimes that do not. We attempt no closed definition, for
the law on the subject is neither settled nor static.”72 In the decades that followed,
courts and commentators have sought guidance to assist in cases where imposing
strict liability might feel at odds with intuitions about culpability and justice.73
In United States v. Bass, for example, Justice Thurgood Marshall
stressed the role of the court in checking the scope of criminal statutes.74
66 Id. at 247–48.
67 See id. at 248.
68 See id.
69 Id. at 272–73.
70 Id. at 254–56.
71 See id. at 254–56, 261–62.
72 Id. at 260.
73 See, e.g., Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 422 (1990) (describing
“longstanding principles of lenity, which demand resolution of ambiguities in criminal
statutes in favor of the defendant”); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971)
(“[A]mbiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of
lenity.”); Aziz Z. Huq & Genevieve Lakier, The Triumph of Fault in Public Law, 131 HARV.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2940016
[http://perma.cc/4KBT-K97P]; John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the
Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 198 (1985); Joseph E.
Kennedy, Making the Crime Fit the Punishment, 51 EMORY L.J. 753, 755 (2002) (proposing
“clear statement” rules for criminal statutes).
74 United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347–48 (1971).
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“In various ways over the years,” the Court “has stated that when choice
has to be made between two readings of what conduct Congress has made a
crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require
that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite.”75
Justice Marshall’s concerns find purchase in a range of interpretive
rules and legal doctrines.76 For example, the rule of lenity, a canon of
construction, instructs judges to construe ambiguous criminal statues in
favor of defendants.77 Similarly, courts have struck down statutes as void
for vagueness when the language is so unclear that it fails to provide a
defendant with constitutionally adequate notice and invites discriminatory
enforcement.78 In recent years courts (and, notably, the Supreme Court)
have reached for these and other interpretive tools more frequently when
faced with prosecutors’ broad readings of statutes or when faced with the
at-times-shocking application of expansive criminal prohibitions.79
So, we might see mens rea reform as reflecting this skepticism of strict
liability and as operating in tandem with judicial hostility to
overcriminalization. In the next Part, I describe proposed mens rea reform
legislation and explain how it operates against the backdrop of
overcriminalization and interpretive framework of strict liability.
75 Id. (internal quotation omitted).
76 But see generally Brown, supra note 47 (tracking resistance to checks on strict
liability).
77 See, e.g., Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 229 (1985) (“Invoking the ‘time-
honored interpretive guideline’ that ‘ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes
should be resolved in favor of lenity’ . . . .”); Bass, 404 U.S. at 347–48; Bell v. United
States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955) (“When Congress leaves to the Judiciary the task of imputing
to Congress an undeclared will, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity.”);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 1007, 1029 (1989) (“The rule of lenity rests upon the due process value that
government should not punish people who have no reasonable notice that their activities are
criminally culpable, as well as the separation-of-powers value that prosecutors and courts
should be unusually cautious in expanding upon legislative prohibitions where the penalty is
severe.”).
78 See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2566 (2015); City of Chi. v.
Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999); Connally v. Gen. Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)
(“[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application
violates the first essential of due process of law.”); Carissa Byrne Hessick, Vagueness
Principles, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1137, 1138 (2016).
79 See, e.g., infra notes 281–283, and accompanying text; Yates v. United States, 135 S.
Ct. 1074 (2015); Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015); Bond v. United States,
134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014); Carissa Byrne Hessick, Johnson v. United States and the Future of
the Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 152 (2016) (discussing
evolutions in the theory and application of vagueness).
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II. THE TERMS OFMENS REAREFORM
Understanding the context of mens rea reform and the impetus behind
its enthusiastic support requires a reckoning with the place of strict liability
in criminal law. But, mens rea reform is not a rejection of criminal strict
liability. Indeed, under the terms of proposed legislation, Congress
certainly might dispense with any mental state requirement. But, Congress
would have to do so explicitly—silence wouldn’t be enough. In this Part, I
set forth the terms of the recent and pending legislative proposals that have
generated controversy. While broader questions about the place of strict
liability in criminal law may stand as the backdrop for contemporary policy
debates, it is the mens rea reform statutes that have served as the
battleground for this latest round of debates about the proper place and
scope of criminal liability.
“Mens rea reform” describes a legislative agenda designed to address
concerns about overcriminalization and statutes without clear mental state
requirements.80 Proposed legislation generally includes two components:
(1) a default mental state requirement,81 and (2) a broader requirement that
defendants know they are acting unlawfully.82 In this Part, I address each
component in turn.
A. REINTERPRETING SILENCE
First, proposed legislation typically imposes a default mental state
requirement.83 Many statutes are silent as to the mental state required for a
given element.84 For example, imagine a statute that states: “It is a crime to
80 For a helpful discussion of two recent unsuccessful bills and their possible application,
see RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, MENS REA REFORM: A
BRIEFOVERVIEW (Apr. 14, 2016).
81 See, e.g., Mens Rea Reform Act of 2015, S. 2289, 114th Cong. (2015) (“If a state of
mind is not specified for an element of the offense, it must be shown that the defendant acted
willfully.”); Criminal Code Improvement Act of 2015, H.R. 4002, 114th Cong. (2015) (“A
conviction for such federal criminal offense requires proof that a defendant acted
knowingly.”).
82 See H.R. 4002, supra note 81 (“[I]f the offense consists of conduct that a reasonable
person in the same or similar circumstances would not know, or would not have reason to
believe, was unlawful, the Government must prove that the defendant knew, or had reason to
believe, the conduct was unlawful.”).
83 See, e.g., Mens Rea Reform Act of 2017, S. 1902, 115th Cong. (2017); Stopping
Over-Criminalization Act of 2015, H.R. 3401, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. 4002; S. 2289.
84 See, e.g., Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994) (discussing competing
approaches to interpreting silence with respect to mental states); Morissette v. United States,
342 U.S. 246, 262 (1952) (same); State v. Al-Naseer, 734 N.W.2d 679, 684 (Minn. 2007)
(addressing statutory silence in a vehicular homicide case); Garnett v. State, 632 A.2d 797,
802 (Md. 1993) (addressing a rape statute without a clear mens rea provision); State v.
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possess a gun capable of holding more than nine bullets.” Further, imagine
a Defendant, Dan, who is prosecuted for possessing a gun that, in fact,
contained a clip housing fourteen bullets. What must the prosecution prove
beyond a reasonable doubt? Certainly, that Dan possessed the gun and that
the gun could accommodate a high-capacity clip. But does the prosecution
need to show that Dan knew how many bullets his gun could hold? Does
the prosecution even need to prove that Dan knew he possessed a gun at
all? At common law, it would not be clear.85 Because of statutory silence,
a trial court would need to determine whether this was a strict liability
statute or whether the legislator intended that some mental state
requirement be read into the statute.86 As should be clear, this is a tricky
enterprise that has very real consequences—whether the prosecution must
prove knowledge might be the difference between a guilty verdict (or, more
likely, plea) and lengthy prison sentence, on the one hand, and an acquittal,
on the other.
Mens rea reform legislation would alter this interpretive exercise. For
example, the Mens Rea Reform Act of 2017 specifies that “the mere
absence of a specified state of mind for an element of a covered offense in
the text of the covered offense shall not be construed to mean that Congress
affirmatively intended not to require the Government to prove any state of
mind with respect to that element.”87 Instead of a deep dive into legislative
history (or some textualist inquiry),88 the court simply would apply a
default rule. Most bills would require knowledge, so the court simply
would read knowledge into the statute.89 Therefore, the prosecution would
need to prove that Dan knowingly possessed a gun capable of
accommodating more than nine bullets. Whether the case went to trial or
whether Dan pleaded guilty, then, would rest on the strength of the
prosecution’s evidence about Dan’s mental state.
As discussed in Part I, absent a default mens rea requirement, courts
grapple with whether, when, and how to read in a mental state requirement.
In Staples v. United States, a case similar to Dan’s, the Supreme Court was
Audette, 543 A.2d 1315, 1317 (Vt. 1988) (addressing statutory silence). See generally
Catherine L. Carpenter, supra note 41, at 358 (discussing historical approaches to legislative
silence regarding mental state requirements).
85 See generally supra note 84.
86 See Staples, 511 U.S. at 605.
87 Mens Rea Reform Act of 2017, 115 S. 1902.
88 Cf. Guyora Binder, Felony Murder and Mens Rea Default Rules: A Study in Statutory
Interpretation, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 399, 437–38 (2000) (explaining approaches to
interpreting legislative silence as to mens rea).
89 See, e.g., S. 2289; H.R. 4002.
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asked to interpret Congressional silence in the National Firearms Act.90
Under the Act, it was unlawful “for any person to possess a machinegun
that [was] not properly registered with the Federal Government.”91 Harold
E. Staples, III had been convicted in Oklahoma of violating the act by
failing to federally register his gun.92 While the statute was silent as to the
mens rea required, Staples argued that the government was required to have
proven that he “knew the weapon he possessed had the characteristics that
brought it within the statutory definition of a machinegun.”93 A divided
Court concluded that Staples was right—the statute included an implied
mens rea requirement as to each element of the offense.94
In the majority opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas lays out a range of
factors or interpretive rules that courts should look to in determining
whether a legislature intended to impose strict liability.95 Building on the
“public welfare” analysis discussed in Part I, the Court concludes that some
public welfare offenses might impose strict liability, but they generally do
so only if they display some of the following factors or characteristics: (1)
they are relatively new crimes; (2) they expose defendants to relatively low
penalty or stigma; (3) they regulate inherently dangerous activity; (4) they
produce diffuse, rather than individualized harm; and (5) they would lead to
prosecutions where it was very difficult to prove mens rea.96
These considerations appear to speak to the idea that strict liability
reflects a sort of tort-like regulatory approach to criminal lawmaking.97
But, even so, the Court does not provide clear guidelines going forward.98
Indeed, after walking through these considerations, the majority
acknowledged the uncertainty of the interpretive exercise: “We emphasize
that our holding is a narrow one. As in our prior cases, our reasoning
depends upon a commonsense evaluation of the nature of the particular
90 Staples, 511 U.S. at 602.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 603–04.
93 Id. at 602.
94 Id.
95 See generally id.
96 See generally id.
97 Such concerns also might apply to the criminalization of negligent conduct. Michael
T. Cahill, Attempt by Omission, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1207, 1242 (2009) (“[U]sing criminal law
to punish mere negligence . . . runs the risk of blurring the tort-crime distinction and
reducing the moral authority of criminal law . . . ”).
98 See Thompson, supra note 80, at 1 (“Supplementing the statutory text, the Supreme
Court has developed a set of presumptions to apply when a mens rea term is omitted.
However, the Court has applied these rules in a somewhat ad hoc fashion depending on a
variety of factors . . . ”).
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device or substance Congress has subjected to regulation and the
expectations that individuals may legitimately have in dealing with the
regulated items.”99 In short, the interpretation of legislative silence is an
inexact science, leading to the potential for dramatically different outcomes
depending on the judge, the strength of the briefing, or the facts.
While understanding mens rea reform proposals requires us to
appreciate the debates regarding strict liability, the proposals aren’t (or at
least aren’t explicitly) out-and-out rejections of strict liability. Instead, they
offer a clear answer to the sorts of interpretive problems in Dotterweich,
Morrissette, Staples, and similar cases. The proposed approach is hardly
unheard of. Indeed, it mirrors the approach adopted by the Model Penal
Code (MPC).100 In MPC jurisdictions, the default mens rea is
“recklessness,” so any statutory silence is interpreted to impose a
recklessness requirement.101 This is a lower bar than knowledge, but it still
eliminates the possibility of strict liability in cases like Dan’s and ensures
some degree of interpretive uniformity and guidance.
According to Stuntz, “[b]y most accounts, the single most important
rule in the MPC is the establishment of recklessness—a culpability level
that involves subjective fault—as the default mens rea . . . .”102 And, as
Kenneth Simons argues, the imposition of a “default mental state is
important as a matter of principle. For it expresses the classic liberal idea
that moral culpability is, and criminal liability should be, based on a
conscious choice to do wrong.”103 This approach also would seek to
recalibrate the balance between culpability and harm in the federal
sentencing scheme. To the extent the rise of strict liability offenses (or, at
least, offenses with no specified mens rea) reflect a legislative emphasis on
harm over culpability,104 mens rea reform legislation would elevate
culpability in the calculus. Rather than predicating punishment solely on a
finding of harmful conduct, a heightened mens rea requirement would re-
focus judicial inquiry on an individual defendant’s culpability.
99 Staples, 511 U.S. at 619.
100 SeeMODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03 (1985).
101 Id.
102 Stuntz, supra note 6, at 600 n.276. Significantly, though, Stuntz notes that—as of
2001—only half of the states that had adopted the MPC’s “culpability structure” also had
adopted a default mental state requirement of recklessness. Id.
103 Simons, supra note 7, at 188.
104 See Aya Gruber, A Distributive Theory of Criminal Law, 52 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1, 48–49 (2010) (“The federal sentencing guideline revolution in the 1980s was
perhaps the single most important development signaling the rise of harm and the decline of
culpability in penal law.”).
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B. OTHERWISE LAWFUL CONDUCT
The second prong of proposed mens rea reform legislation is more
unusual and more controversial. This component would require that the
prosecution prove that defendants knew that they were breaking the law.
Most criminal statutes say nothing about a defendant’s mental state as to the
legality of conduct.105 Take Dan’s gun possession case. Even if the court
were to read in a knowledge requirement, there would be no requirement
that Dan knew that his conduct was unlawful. As long as the prosecution
could prove that he knew that he possessed a gun and that he knew that the
gun could accommodate more than nine bullets (the material elements of
the offense), the prosecution could obtain a guilty verdict. Dan could not
raise a successful “mistake of law” defense—that is, his belief that he was
behaving lawfully would be irrelevant to any legal inquiry. Therefore, Dan
would be guilty even if he had believed reasonably that he was acting
lawfully.
Dan’s situation mirrors a textbook case of “mistake of law”: People v.
Marerro.106 In Marerro, Julio Marerro, a corrections officer from
Connecticut brought his handgun with him on a trip to New York City.107
Under New York law, it was a criminal offense to carry a handgun without
a permit, unless the carrier was a “peace officer,” a category defined by
statute and interpreted by courts to include police officers and state
correctional workers.108 The problem for Marerro: he worked for a federal
prison in Connecticut. Marerro was arrested and prosecuted under the
statute.109 He claimed that he had made a good faith mistake—he thought
that he was a peace officer, he had read the law, and he even had consulted
with friends and coworkers.110 The New York Court of Appeals was
unconvinced. Misinterpreting a criminal statute (even if the
misinterpretation were reasonable) could not be a defense.111
At first blush, there may be nothing troubling about prosecuting Dan
or Marerro. They did break the law, after all, and perhaps the societal
105 See generally Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of Law Is an Excuse-but Only for the
Virtuous, 96 MICH. L. REV. 127 (1997) (discussing the general absence of an excuse for
unknowingly breaking the law). But see Sharon L. Davies, The Jurisprudence of Willfulness:
An Evolving Theory of Excusable Ignorance, 48 DUKE L.J. 341, 344–45 (1998) (cataloging
statutes that courts have interpreted as requiring knowledge of the conduct’s illegality).
106 507 N.E.2d 1068 (N.Y. 1987).
107 Id. at 1069.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 1070.
111 See id. at 1073.
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interest in ensuring compliance with the law (or in serving the substantive
ends sought by the specific gun possession statute) outweighs any nagging
sense that they are not morally blameworthy.112 Indeed, the axiom that
“ignorance of the law excuses no one” speaks to a belief that members of a
polity have some obligation to know and obey the laws that govern the
community.113 The “public welfare” reasoning of the Balint and
Dotterweich Courts suggests that the harm to an individual defendant might
pale in comparison to the greater social utility of reducing ownership of
dangerous weapons.
But, is such an expectation reasonable? There are over four thousand
federal criminal laws, and, over the last fifty years, states and localities
have criminalized conduct at an alarming rate.114 Put simply, it is hard to
believe that anyone—including the people who pass or enforce criminal
laws—actually lives up to this theoretical obligation to know the law.115
Given the massive scope of the substantive criminal law, there is good
reason to think that someone trying to fulfill this obligation and comply
with the law might have trouble doing so.116 And, further, the distributive
consequences of such a knowledge gap might be particularly concerning:
the wealthy, educated defendant (or the corporate defendant with skilled
counsel and/or a compliance department) might be able to stay more
apprised of the law than a poor, uneducated defendant.117 Indeed, we might
understand the prevalence of strict liability or limited mens rea
112 Cf. Samuel W. Buell, Culpability and Modern Crime, 103 GEO. L.J. 547, 593 (2015)
(critiquing an expansive notice requirement that would allow defendants to raise a defense if
they did not know that the specific conduct they engaged in was criminal).
113 See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin et al., The Mistake of Law Defense and an Unconstitutional
Provision of the Model Penal Code, 93 N.C. L. REV. 139, 144 (2014); David De Gregorio,
People v. Marrero and Mistake of Law, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 229, 243 (1988).
114 See, e.g., Villasenor, supra note 24.
115 See, e.g., Chin, et al., supra note 113, at 145; Susan L. Pilcher, Ignorance, Discretion
and the Fairness of Notice: Confronting “Apparent Innocence” in the Criminal Law, 33
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 5 (1995) (“We live in an era of rapidly expanding criminal liability, in
which conduct never before within the reach of the criminal justice system is regulated.
Substantive expansions of liability vastly increase the potential for dissonance between law
and community expectations.”).
116 See Paul J. Larkin, Jr, Public Choice Theory and Overcriminalization, 36 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 715, 778 (2013).
117 See Levin, supra note 1, at 300–01. But see John G. Malcolm, Morally Innocent,
Legally Guilty: The Case for Mens Rea Reform, 18 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 40 (2017)
(“While some critics argue that mens rea reform would only benefit wealthy corporations
and their executives who flout environmental and other health and safety regulations, the
truth is that such corporations and their high-ranking executives are able to hire lawyers to
navigate complex regulations and avoid prosecution, while individuals and small businesses
lack the time, money, and expertise to avoid accidentally violating obscure rules.”).
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requirements in the corporate crime realm as reflecting societal
expectations that “responsible corporate agents” should understand the law
and be more vigilant than less sophisticated actors.118
It is worth noting one major limitation on this second component of
proposed mens rea reform legislation: these provisions would require that a
defendant knew she was breaking the law in situations when a reasonable
person would not expect her conduct to be criminal.119 The Stopping Over-
Criminalization Act of 2015, for example, would require that “in the case of
an offense, such as a regulatory offense, where a defendant might
reasonably be unaware the conduct could be criminally punished, the
Government must prove the defendant had reason to know the defendant’s
conduct was unlawful.”120 So, the prosecution would not need to prove that
a defendant knew it was illegal to kidnap a child, but the prosecution
probably would have to prove that a defendant knew or should have known
it was a criminal offense to camp in a specific corner of a national park.
This limitation might be necessary from an efficiency or common
sense standpoint. Additionally, it is consistent with the way that courts
already interpret criminal statutes. Courts generally consider the presence
or absence of a mens rea requirement a significant factor when they are
concerned that defendants might be prosecuted for conduct they believed to
be lawful.121 That is, courts often are confronted with constitutional
challenges based on a claim that the absence of a mental state requirement
has failed to provide notice and has fallen afoul of the constitutional limits
on criminal statutes.122 In the context of “mistake of fact” cases, courts
118 United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672 (1975) (“The requirements of foresight and
vigilance imposed on responsible corporate agents are beyond question demanding, and
perhaps onerous, but they are no more stringent than the public has a right to expect of those
who voluntarily assume positions of authority in business enterprises whose services and
products affect the health and well-being of the public that supports them.”); see also
Kelman, supra note 41, at 605–06.
119 See Criminal Code Improvement Act of 2015, H.R. 4002, 114th Congr. (2015) (“[I]f
the offense consists of conduct that a reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances
would not know, or would not have reason to believe, was unlawful, the Government must
prove that the defendant knew, or had reason to believe, the conduct was unlawful.”).
120 Stopping Over-Criminalization Act of 2015, 114 H.R. 3401 § 28(b).
121 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 234 (2002); Osborne v. Ohio,
495 U.S. 103, 115 (1990); United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 982 F.2d 1285, 1286
(9th Cir. 1992), rev’d, 513 U.S. 64 (1994); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 110–11
(5th ed. 2010).
122 See, e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153–55 (1959); United States v. Posters
‘N’ Things Ltd., 969 F.2d 652, 657 (8th Cir. 1992); State v. Luedtke, 863 N.W.2d 592, 598
(Wis. 2015); Burns v. State, 512 S.W.2d 928, 933 (Ark. 1974); People v. Finkelstein, 174
N.E.2d 470, 471 (N.Y. 1961).
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generally impose a bar on the defense if a defendant was engaged in
otherwise unlawful conduct.123
However, it may not be so easy to distinguish between clearly criminal
conduct and surprisingly criminal conduct. Indeed, this distinction and the
assumption that it is an easy one to draw represent a core problem with
much of the discourse about “overcriminalization” (and, perhaps, criminal
justice reform generally).124 We might be able to come up with a list of
crimes that fall easily into one category or another—crimes that are clearly
malum in se (i.e., wrong because they are morally blameworthy) and crimes
that are clearly malum prohibitum (i.e., wrong only because they have been
criminalized), but the line is much fuzzier than it initially appears.125
Indeed, in a system where crimes are the product of legislative decision-
making, not some sort of common law process of criminalization, all crimes
are (at least in some sense) malum prohibitum.126 How a legislature
chooses to define murder, rape, or arson is not necessarily an apolitical or
natural process.127 In many ways, a discussion of this issue falls outside the
scope of this Article and is fodder for much more extensive analysis. But I
flag it here as a way of noting that, even if one were enthusiastic about the
basic premises of mens rea reform, there might be reason to ask whether the
proposed legislature lives up to its own claims and its own logic.
More pointedly, this limitation speaks to a distinction in the literature
and discourse on overcriminalization between “good” people who are
caught up in the web of over-expansive criminal law and “real criminals.”
In his statement introducing the Mens Rea Reform Act of 2017, Senator
Hatch argued that the bill would “ensure that honest, hardworking
Americans are not swept up in the criminal justice system for doing things
they didn’t know were against the law.”128 Read skeptically, it’s not a
123 See, e.g., People v. Olsen, 685 P.2d 52, 55 (Cal. 1984) (quoting People v. Lopez, 271
Cal. App. 2d 754, 760–61 (1969) (“[A] mistake of fact relating only to the gravity of an
offense will not shield a deliberate offender from the full consequences of the wrong actually
committed.”); Garnett v. State, 632 A.2d 797, 802 (Md. 1993) (“Statutory rape laws are
often justified on the ‘lesser legal wrong’ theory or the ‘moral wrong’ theory . . . .”); Sanford
H. Kadish, Codifiers of the Criminal Law: Wechsler’s Predecessors, 78 COLUM. L.
REV. 1098, 1119 n.167 (1978) (describing the “lesser crime principle”).
124 See Levin, supra note 1, at 299.
125 See Michael L. Rich, Lessons of Disloyalty in the World of Criminal Informants,
49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1493, 1527 n.234 (2012) (collecting sources).
126 See generally Benjamin Levin, American Gangsters: RICO, Criminal Syndicates,
and Conspiracy Law as Market Control, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105, 154–57 (2013).
127 That is, unless we adopt a “natural law” framework, each and every criminal law—
from the most venal to the most venial—criminalizes “otherwise innocent conduct.”
128 Press Release, Senators Hatch, Lee, Cruz, Perdue, and Paul Introduce Bill to Strength
Criminal Intent Protections (Oct. 7, 2017), https://www.lee.senate.gov/public/index.cfm
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stretch to hear the “honest” and “hardworking” as a racialized or class-
based dog whistle.129 (In his seminal work on overcriminalization, William
Stuntz critiqued the expansion of criminal codes that had led to the
prohibition of “marginal middle-class misbehavior.”)130 Even read more
generously, the statement clearly delineates the class of Americans worthy
of sympathy (us) and the real law-breakers (them). The othering of people
caught up in the criminal system remains a major problem and impediment
to meaningful criminal justice reform.131 Indeed, in Part IV, I will return to
this concept and argue that opposition to mens rea reform may actually
reflect such an othering.132 But the rhetoric of and literature on mens rea
reform fail to reckon with these distinctions.
III. THEDEBATEOVERMENS REA REFORM
What’s so objectionable about mens rea reform? As I suggested at the
end of the previous Part, there might be some logical flaws in the structure
/2017/10/senators-hatch-lee-cruz-perdue-and-paul-introduce-bill-to-strength-criminal-intent-
protections [http://perma.cc/VS7S-EPDG] (emphasis added).
129 Cf. IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, DOG WHISTLE POLITICS: HOW CODED RACIAL APPEALS
HAVE REINVENTED RACISM ANDWRECKED THEMIDDLE CLASS 178–79 (2014) (discussing
the way “hard-working Americans” was used rhetorically to describe the white working
class in opposition to black “welfare queens”).
130 Stuntz, supra note 6, at 509. Indeed, such a class-based rhetoric permeates discussion
of white-collar crime. In defining the term, sociologist Edwin Sutherland wrote of criminal
conduct in the class “composed of respectable or at least respected business and professional
men.” Edwin H. Sutherland, White-Collar Criminality, 5 AM. SOC. REV. 1, 1 (1940); see
also BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH
CORPORATIONS 87–88 (2014); JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL
PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 47 (2003);
Wayne A. Logan, Criminal Law Sanctuaries, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 321, 321–91
(2003) (collecting sources).
131 See, e.g., FORMAN, supra note 12, at 221 (describing the cultural hostility to “violent
criminals” as a population distinct from “nonviolent criminals”); Jody Armour, Nigga
Theory: Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity in the Substantive Criminal Law, 12 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 9, 9–10 (2014) (arguing that legal culture inscribes a racialized dichotomy between
“criminals” and the rest of society); Erin R. Collins, Status Courts, 105 GEO. L.J. 1481,
1522 (2017) (describing the ways in which status courts complicate the traditional “othering
effect” of criminal process and punishment); Stephen Herbert, Policing the Contemporary
City: Broken Windows or Shoring up Neo-liberalism?, 4 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 445,
458 (2001) (“Broken windows reinforces an ‘othering’ of the criminal population that allows
state actors to justify being tough on crime, and that fuels stratospheric rates of
incarceration.”); Jocelyn Simonson, The Place of “the People” in Criminal Procedure 119
COLUM. L. REV. 249, 270–71 (examining the ways in which constitutional criminal
procedure treats criminal defendants as effectively banished from the polity) .
132 See Part IV.C., infra.
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of the proposals. Yet that, in and of itself, hardly seems fatal.133 It is not as
though Congress generally passes only legislation that represents the
paragon of logical and intellectual consistency. Rather, mens rea reform
has faced two primary objections: (1) it is not responsive to the real
problems that plague the criminal system; and (2) it is designed to protect
the wrong people.134 These two objections are closely related, but in this
Part, I address them separately for the sake of clarity.135 While some on the
left have supported mens rea reform,136 the objections outlined in this Part
have generally been voiced exclusively by left or progressive politicians
and activists.
133 Perhaps a stronger version of this argument is that the mens rea reform provisions
would be difficult to apply or fail to specify just how the criminal code should be modified.
See, e.g., Editorial, Don’t Change the Legal Rule on Intent, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2015, at
SR8 (“This confusing standard would create endless litigation as the government and
defendants argued over how, exactly, to meet it in each new case.”). That said, if the
argument is simply that it’s hard to imagine how a prosecutor could prove recklessness,
knowledge, or intent, then it’s not clear how much such an argument would differ from a
general claim that mental state requirements are too exacting or are imprecise. From
“beyond a reasonable doubt” to the painstaking mental state definitions laid out in the MPC,
criminal law leaves a great deal of interpretive wiggle room to lawyers, judges, and juries.
Maybe the corporate context makes this interpretive exercise even more difficult. But the
argument about “confusing standards” appears out of touch with a legal system that relies
heavily on similarly confusing and indeterminate definitions, standards, and requirements.
134 See Levin, supra note 1, at 301–02.
135 There certainly are other objections to mens rea reform. Indeed, many Republicans
and critics on the right generally oppose efforts at criminal justice reform or shrinking the
size of the criminal system. But, in this Article, I do not address those critiques. Of course,
people who think that the system is functioning properly or is too lenient will not be
enthusiastic about or supportive of proposals designed to shrink the system. But my concern
here is with scholars, activists, and politicians who have expressed concern about mass
incarceration or who have cloaked themselves in reformist language. From a reformist
perspective, opponents also might worry about mens rea reform functioning as a “Trojan
Horse” for conservatives and libertarians seeking to dismantle the welfare state. See Takei,
supra note 12, at 169. This critique is closely related to the concern about mens rea reform
reaching the wrong defendants, but it might also speak to a broader political concern about
the legitimation of otherwise objectionable political positions or the de-radicalization of
reformist goals or values. Cf. MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE
LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN POLITICS 258–82 (2014) (critiquing the role of a small-
government right in criminal policy reform). Alternatively, left reformists might worry that
by embracing a conservative reform designed to reach white-collar crime, they might play
into a false narrative that “criminal justice reform had been achieved,” thus stymying future
reforms. See generally Levin, supra note 1.
136 See Barkow & Osler, supra note 1, at 422 (“Notably, the mens rea reform provision
had its own bipartisan support in the House, and most criminal law scholars and professional
bar associations have lamented for years that strict liability laws have no place in the
criminal sphere.”).
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A. SOLVING THE WRONG PROBLEMS?
The first critique of mens rea reform is that it simply misses the point.
Understanding this critique (and evaluating its worth) requires us to
appreciate and agree on what the point is.137 That is, what’s wrong with the
current state of affairs in U.S. criminal law? There are many answers to
that question—perhaps it is the astronomical prison population; perhaps it is
the length of sentences; perhaps it is the dramatic racial and socioeconomic
disparities at each stage in the criminal process; perhaps it is the sheer
number of criminal laws; perhaps it is the violence and militarization
increasingly associated with policing; or, perhaps it is the economic costs of
operating the carceral state. This list represents only a sample of issues that
a reformist agenda might address. And, as I have argued elsewhere,
figuring out what problems we are concerned with is essential to a
meaningful discussion about criminal justice reform.138 But, even without
drilling down to first principles, it should be easy to see that mens rea
reform probably is not directly responsive to many of those concerns.
Worries about notice, respect for “rule of law,” and the criminalization
of apparently innocent conduct may be compelling, but mens rea reform
does not speak clearly to questions of distributive and racial justice. Nor
does it have much to say about prison populations or the social
marginalization experienced by people caught up in the criminal system. In
short, mens rea reform does not speak the language of mass
incarceration.139 And, while there might be a range of reasons that mens rea
reform is normatively desirable or why it is a policy that should be
supported, it is hard to view it as the sort of significant step that many
reformers seek.
In this respect, we might view mens rea reform as an outgrowth of a
more formalist approach to criminal law and criminal justice.140 Where
137 This is similar to my point in Part I that truly understanding and solving the problem
of “overcriminalization” would require a baseline agreement or understanding of what
would constitute an appropriate amount of criminalization. See supra notes 35–40, and
accompanying text.
138 See generally Levin, supra note 1.
139 Cf. David Garland, Introduction: The Meaning of Mass Imprisonment, in MASS
IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 1, 5–6 (David Garland ed., 2001)
(defining “mass imprisonment” in terms of racialized social control); Kimberlé W.
Crenshaw, From Private Violence to Mass Incarceration: Thinking Intersectionally About
Women, Race, and Social Control, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1418, 1446 (2012) (same).
140 In drawing this link, I hardly mean to suggest that criminal law scholarship rooted in
moral philosophy doesn’t have a role to play in discussions of criminal policy or in
discussions of structural reform. Rather, I mean to suggest that the sorts of structural, social,
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much contemporary criminal law scholarship and policy discourse take on
the language of sociology or criminology in examining the place of the
criminal system in society,141 mens rea debates (at least at first blush)
appear to remain rooted in the realm of moral philosophy or formal legal
analysis. Preoccupied with moral wrong and the theoretical justifications
for criminal liability, such an approach often has little to say about the
consequences of punishment, the nature of incarceration, or the forms of
enforcement or social control that criminal law might trigger.142 Questions
of morality and formal legal reasoning certainly might be important or
might have a critical role to play in scholarly discourse or in determinations
of institutional design. But they appear far removed from the sorts of realist
questions that define our contemporary moment in criminal law and policy
debates or the sorts of projects associated with new brands of “criminal
justice thinking.”143
Similarly, mens rea reform proponents tend to draw from a
problematic tendency of the anti-overcriminalization movement: a fixation
on absurd statutes and absurd applications of criminal law. It is common in
or cultural considerations that define more institutionally focused criminal law scholarship
are not always foregrounded in morally inflected traditional criminal law scholarship.
141 See, e.g., Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement,
126 YALE L.J. 2054 (2017) (using social theory to critique policing practices and the
policing reform movement); Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass
Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611 (2014) (providing an empirically grounded theoretical
account of criminal courts as engines of social control); Benjamin Levin, Rethinking the
Boundaries of “Criminal Justice”, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 619 (2018) (describing the
sociological turn in criminal law scholarship); Mariana Valverde, “Miserology”: A New
Look at the History of Criminology, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING (Sharon
Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff, eds. 2017) (framing criminal law scholarship within a
history of criminological thinking and within an intellectual project focusing on lived
experience).
142 See, e.g., Michael T. Cahill, Criminal Law’s “Mediating Rules”: Balancing,
Harmonization, or Accident?, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 199, 199 (2007) (critiquing the
“tendency of theoretical work in criminal law . . . to focus on . . . questions about the proper
justification, scope, and amount of punishment in the abstract, while giving significantly less
consideration to the various institutional and procedural aspects of any concrete system of
imposing such punishment”); Ahmed A. White, Capitalism, Social Marginality, and the
Rule of Law’s Uncertain Fate in Modern Society, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 759, 786 (2005)
(“Conventional accounts of the criminal justice system tend to obscure its social control
agenda behind the idea that its origins and functions lie with the prevention and punishment
of crime or even the humanitarian reform of offenders. Such purported bases of criminal
justice, which are ideologized ad nauseam in ‘justification theories,’ are not always
inaccurate characterizations of what the system actually does and how it arose.”).
143 See generally THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING (Sharon Dolovich &
Alexandra Natapoff, eds. 2017) (collecting work on the theories and institutions that drive
the contemporary criminal system).
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the academic and advocacy literature on overcriminalization for critics to
focus on what they take to be the outrageous application of criminal law—
the criminal prohibition on the unauthorized use of “Woodsy Owl”; the
prosecution of a defendant for mispackaging lobsters, etc.144 From a
rhetorical standpoint, these examples provide a compelling illustration of
the staggering breadth of the criminal code. And, for proponents of mens
rea reform, they also show how dangerous strict liability can be: if no one
would expect conduct to be criminalized, or if that conduct is done
frequently, then a strict liability standard seems as though it allows for a
huge amount of unknowingly criminal conduct. (Such a result would, in
turn, invite selective enforcement or erode respect for the legal system.)
But, even among staunch critics of mass incarceration and proponents
of mens rea reform, no one claims that these absurd cases reflect the
majority of criminal prosecutions or that federal prisons are full of
defendants who unknowingly purchased a high-flow toilet or sold
mislabeled cheese. That is, these critiques might be compelling, but they
tell us little about the mine run of criminal cases and fail to account for
mass incarceration.
We live in a society defined by widespread criminalization,145 an
epidemic of racialized police violence,146 and an astronomical population of
people caged or under state correctional supervision.147 Assuming that’s a
fair characterization of the state of criminal law and policy, it is easy to see
why critics might view discussions of mens rea reform as missing the point.
Against that backdrop of staggering state violence, discussions about the
144 See, e.g., Malcolm, supra note 11, at 279–80 (cataloging examples of
overcriminalization, including statutes that criminalize: “install[ing] a toilet that uses too
much water per flush,” “misus[ing] the slogan ‘Give a Hoot, Don’t Pollute,’” “sell[ing] malt
liquor labeled ‘prewar strength’”); Mila Sohoni, The Idea of “Too Much Law”, 80
FORDHAM L. REV. 1585, 1606 n.118 (2012); Panel: Criminal Law at the Federal Level, 18
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 97, 108 (2013) (discussing United States v. McNabb, 331 F.3d 1228,
1247 (11th Cir. 2003), as amended (May 29, 2003), a case involving the transportation and
packaging of lobsters); A Crime a Day (@CrimeADay), TWITTER,
https://twitter.com/CrimeADay [http://perma.cc/VS7S-EPDG] (listing bizarre and outlandish
applications of federal criminal law).
145 See, e.g., Eisha Jain, Capitalizing on Criminal Justice, 67 DUKE L.J. 1381, 1389
(2018).
146 See, e.g., PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN (2017); Bell, supra
note 141; Alice Ristroph, The Constitution of Police Violence, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1182
(2017).
147 See, e.g., Sara Mayeux, The Idea of “The Criminal Justice System”, 45 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 55, 60 (2018); Allegra M. McLeod, Confronting the Carceral State, 104 GEO. L.J. 1405,
1406 (2016).
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“rule of law” and the proper way of assessing moral blame might become
yet another debate about how many angels can dance on the head of a pin.
As between the two critiques, I find this one (i.e., that mens rea reform
is not responsive to the major problems with the criminal system) to be the
most compelling.148 But it is not entirely clear why this critique would
indicate that mens rea reform is a policy to be opposed, rather than a
proposal that should be only one small piece of a larger, more ambitious
reform agenda.149 If the broader criminal justice reform project is one of
shifting away from a criminal model of social control or of addressing
social problems, then any reduction in criminal law or criminalization
would appear to be a step in the right direction.150
While not expressed by reform opponents, there are two reasons why
mis-directed reform (i.e., reform that doesn’t get to the core issues) might
be a problem: (1) legitimation; and (2) preemption. First, by purporting to
fix the criminal system with a minor, perhaps misdirected legislative
intervention mens rea might legitimate the criminal system and its
outcomes.151 That is, the message from such “reform” might be that as long
as defendants possess the appropriate mental state, whatever happens to
them is justified and legitimate. As a result, mens rea reform might lead to
a mistaken belief that we should be less worried about prison conditions,
collateral consequences, coercive plea bargains, violent law enforcement,
148 I have articulated a version of this argument elsewhere. See Levin, supra note 1, at
300–01.
149 To the extent that mens rea reform were being offered in lieu of other reforms, or if
critics believed that it might be used to prevent future, sweeping reform, that would be a
different story. See note 135, supra. It is worth noting that one critique from the left has been
that mens rea reform has been used opportunistically to hijack discussions on criminal
justice reform. See, e.g., Editorial, Holding Sentencing Reform Hostage, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/07/opinion/sunday/holding-sentencing-reform-
hostage.html [http://perma.cc/4VA4-WTC5].
150 As discussed, infra, it may be that some reformers have a different vision of criminal
justice reform, one rooted less in decarceration or decriminalization, and more in shifting the
distribution or distributive commitments of the criminal system.
151 On this concept of legitimation, see, e.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF
ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SIÈCLE (1997); SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF
ANTONIO GRAMSCI (Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith eds.& trans., 1971); Louis
Althusser, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an Investigation), in
LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS 127 (Ben Brewster trans., 1971; Paul D.
Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 2176, 2189
(2013); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two
Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 429–
32 (1995).
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and a host of other structural defects.152 This is a fair and important
critique. But it is worth noting that it actually isn’t a part of the rhetoric
being used by mens rea reform opponents. Instead, the language they’ve
used explicitly embraces punitive or carceral solutions and the legitimacy of
those options.153 Second, a narrow or incremental reform might preempt or
preclude more sweeping change. To know how realistic or compelling such
a concern is, we would need to know how much political will for criminal
justice reform (particularly on the right) might be affected by the passage of
a mens rea reform statute.154 But, it is worth noting that this concern of
preemption or preclusion could be applied (perhaps fairly) to almost any
incremental reform project: the saying goes that “the perfect is the enemy of
the good,” but the good also may well be the enemy of the perfect.
B. SAVING THE WRONG DEFENDANTS?
The second critique shares some similarities with the first critique—
namely the view that mens rea reform represents a misdirection of reformist
energy that does not speak to the problems faced by the poor, people of
color, and other marginalized groups that suffer as a result of mass
incarceration.155 Unlike the first critique, though, this one does make clear
152 See, e.g., FORMAN, supra note 12, at 230 (arguing that embracing reforms focused
only on non-violent crime could mean that “criminal justice reform’s first step—relief for
nonviolent drug offenders—could easily become its last” because this approach “effectively
mark[s] this larger group of violent offenders as permanently out-of-bounds”); PFAFF, supra
note 35, at 31 (“[T]he rhetoric and tactics used to push through reforms for lower-level
offenses often explicitly involve imposing even harsher punishments on those convicted of
violent crimes.”).
153 See notes 154–167, infra, and accompanying text.
154 Legitimation arguments also rest on some range of assumptions about the social and
political significance of a given reform, decision, or legal action. See generally Alan
Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 379 (1983)
(critiquing legitimation critiques).
155 The moral culpability analysis of mens rea reform proponents looks very different
from a range of relatively common claims about the potentially diminished moral culpability
of less privileged defendants. See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 961 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting); RICHARD L. LIPPKE, RETHINKING IMPRISONMENT
101–02 (2007); Richard Delgado, Rotten Social Background: Should the Criminal Law
Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAW & INEQ. J. 9 (1985).
That said, mens rea reform proposals have attracted support from public defenders who
argue that these bills might help poor defendants of color. See, e.g., Press Release, Senators
Hatch, Lee, Cruz, Perdue, and Paul Introduce Bill to Strength Criminal Intent Protections
(Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.lee.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2017/10/senators-hatch-lee-
cruz-perdue-and-paul-introduce-bill-to-strength-criminal-intent-protections
[http://perma.cc/VLU5-38WU] (statement of David Patton, Executive Director and
Attorney-in-Chief, Federal Defenders of New York, Inc.) (“As Federal Defenders, we are
acutely aware of the need for mens rea reform. Over 80 percent of people charged with
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why mens rea reform should be opposed: mens rea reform is a political
project that has nothing to do with mass incarceration and everything to do
with deregulation. Democrats have taken to the floor of Congress not to
oppose the reforms as too minor or as misdirected, but because they view
the proposals as a means of undercutting existing regulatory frameworks.156
According to opponents of mens rea reform, the proposals would make it
even more difficult for prosecutors to go after financial crime,
environmental crime, and other sorts of regulatory violations.157
Massachusetts Senator Elizabeth Warren, a leader of the progressive
wing of the Democratic Party and a staunch supporter of increasing
corporate regulation to address income inequality, has been one of the most
vocal opponents of mens rea reform. Senator Warren has criticized such
proposals that would “make it much harder for the government to prosecute
hundreds of corporate crimes—everything from wire fraud to mislabeling
prescription drugs.”158 In 2016, her office prepared a report, Rigged
Justice: 2016 How Weak Enforcement Lets Corporate Offenders Off Easy,
that criticized the mens rea reform movement and cataloged twenty-five
cases in which corporate defendants were not held accountable for their
misconduct.159 The report decried “prosecutorial timidity” and stressed that
the failure to prosecute corporate crimes vigorously was corrosive to
democracy and exacerbated economic inequality.160 Similarly, it repeatedly
made reference to a two-tiered justice system that allowed for prosecution
federal crimes are too poor to afford a lawyer, and nearly 80 percent of people charged with
federal crimes are Black, Hispanic, or Native American. These are our clients, and too many
of them are subject to laws that are neither fair nor consistent with traditional principles of
criminal liability. This bill would help to remedy some of those failings.”).
156 See Matt Ford, Could a Controversial Bill Sink Criminal-Justice Reform in
Congress?, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 26, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/10/will-congress-reform-criminal-
intent/544014/ [http://perma.cc/HU6M-4HRH].
157 See Takei, supra note 12, at 169 (“[S]ome have accused conservatives of using
criminal justice reform as a ‘Trojan Horse’ to advance corporate interests and weaken
environmental regulations.”).
158 Id. Indeed, a major component of Senator Warren’s support for stronger regulations
of the financial sector often has been stronger enforcement of criminal law. See Bridget
Bowman, Elizabeth Warren Releases Report Showing How Corporate Criminals Get Off
Easy, ROLL CALL (Jan. 29, 2016), http://www.rollcall.com/news/home/warren-releases-
rigged-justice-report [http://perma.cc/3YHE-9M63].
159 RIGGED JUSTICE: 2016 HOW WEAK ENFORCEMENT LETS CORPORATE OFFENDERS
OFF EASY (2016), https://www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/Rigged_Justice_2016.pdf
[http://perma.cc/G6NL-FBB6] [hereinafter Rigged Justice].
160 See generally id.
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of less-affluent defendants, but largely shielded the wealthy from
accountability.161
Senator Warren is far from alone in raising these critiques. Illinois
Senator Dick Durbin claimed that proposed mens rea reform legislation
“should be called the White Collar Criminal Immunity Act.”162 In a
petition drafted by Occupy the SEC (an offshoot of Occupy Wall Street,
consisting of former financial industry workers),163 the Criminal Code
Improvement Act of 2015 is referred to as “A ‘Get Out of Jail Free’ Card
for white collar criminals.”164 The petition urges legislators to reject the bill
because it would “make it even more difficult for prosecutors to punish
white collar crime,”165 further empowering the architects of the 2008
financial crisis:
Federal prosecutors already face grave difficulty proving “intent” for corporate
misdeeds because culpable criminal conduct is often hidden deep within the corporate
veil, underneath layers of management, boards and bureaucracy. The Great Recession
of 2008 is a telling example of federal prosecutors’ inability to punis h corporate
wrongdoing. Malfeasance on Wall Street produced a financial crisis that extinguished
nearly 40% of family wealth from 2007 to 2010, pushing the household net worth
back to 1992 levels. Despite these appalling statistics, not even ONE executive at a
major Wall Street bank was criminally charged for playing a role in the 2008 global
financial collapse. Everyday Americans were forced to pay the price for rampant
speculation, mismanagement and fraud on Wall Street.166
In his much-heralded Harvard Law Review article, The President’s
Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, then-President Obama
emphasized the problematic nature of mens rea reform proposals that could
“undermine public safety and harm progressive goals.”167
In this account, there are real criminals that the system is designed to
reach and on whom prosecutors should be focused. Those criminals are the
wielders of capital and corporate executives. And, without the tools of
broadly written strict liability statutes the state will be powerless to curb
capital’s excesses. Criminalization and zealous prosecution might “excite[]
161 See generally id.
162 Ford, supra note 156.
163 See Simon Johnson, An Occupy Wall Street Offshoot Has Its Day, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
16, 2014), https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/01/16/occupy-the-s-e-c-has-its-day/?_p
hp=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 [http://perma.cc/DT5C-6SEH].





167 Barack Obama, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130
HARV. L. REV. 811, 829 n.89 (2017).
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public solidarity,”168 playing up the dynamic of the 1% (here, criminals)
against the 99% (“law-abiding” victims). Such an account certainly is
oversimplified, but it reflects the ways in which populist criminal justice
policies and populist economic rhetoric might find common ground in
critiques of corporate criminality.169
Indeed, as Mark Kelman noted over three decades ago, strict liability
crimes are generally designed to target defendants who “control the means
of production,” and the “defense of strict liability crimes is likewise
grounded in a political agenda—in an attempt to ‘get’ harm-causing
managers.”170 Viewed through this frame, “attack[s] on strict liability
[operate] as a simple class-biased, result-oriented defense of corporate
managers, those persons most likely to ‘unintentionally’ harm others
through routine business operations.”171 Liability rules in criminal law—as
in tort law—are not neutral. They distribute harm, cost, pain, and
punishment.172 So, mens rea reform opponents from the (broadly
conceived) political left appear to base their objections on a claim that the
strict liability rules distribute better and that a move away from strict
liability would simply represent a further upward redistribution of
capital.173 Assuming there is some proper place for criminal law and
criminal punishment, wealthy, privileged, or powerful defendants who
harm the less powerful are deserving targets of prosecution and
punishment.174
Looking at much of the right-leaning literature on overcriminalization
and criminal justice reform, it is hard not to see a deregulatory agenda at
work. The laws commonly identified as representing criminal law’s
excesses often are those relating to administrative agencies or extending the
168 WHITMAN, supra note 130, at 45.
169 For an account of the fraught relationship between populism and criminal
policymaking, see generally LISA L. MILLER, THE MYTH OF MOB RULE: VIOLENT CRIME &
DEMOCRATIC POLITICS (2016).
170 Kelman, supra note 41, at 610.
171 Id. Cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the
Disappearing Tort/crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 195–96 (1991)
(examining the utilitarian justifications for imposing punishment on corporate agents who
may have acted in good faith).
172 See Gruber, supra note 104, at 5 (“[C]riminal rules often distribute punishment to
defendants in order to secure a good such as compensation, satisfaction, or ‘closure’ for
victims.”).
173 See id. at 59.
174 Cf. SAMUEL W. BUELL, CAPITAL OFFENSES: BUSINESS CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA’S CORPORATE AGE 223 (2016) (“When we talk about the fair, right, or
proportionate sentence for a business crime, we’re often talking about equality”).
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reach of environmental or financial protections.175 Critiques of criminal
law from the right often focus on the ways in which criminalization and
prosecution hampers efficient market functioning.176 For example, in his
testimony before the Congressional Over-Criminalization Task Force,
former U.S. Attorney and Bush-era Attorney General George Terwilliger,
III framed the problem of overcriminalization and the need for mens rea
reform against the backdrop of a flawed post-New Deal legal order.177
According to Terwilliger, the government impinges on:
[T]he freedom of each individual to retain the fruits of his or her labor and decide
how, when, and for what to use those funds. Instead, we have a system of taxation
that takes more and more from a few to distribute to many . . . The Federal leviathan
even reaches into our daily life so far as to dictate to us when we awake in the
morning, what kind of light bulbs may illuminate our bathroom, and how much water
can flow through our showerhead . . .
Over-criminalization is part of this larger picture. Thus, efforts by Congress to get its
arms around these issues, such as through this Task Force, are a most significant step
forward . . . I believe the fundamental takeaway is this: We have lost sight of the
proper use of Federal criminal law as a carefully applied tool to protect the means and
instrumentalities of commerce, a goal in harmony with the principles of federalism
and the Framer’s intent.178
In other words, mens rea reform might operate as a prong of a larger
project to scale back progressive regulations and re-orient government with
a mission to protect capital at all costs.
Therefore, Democrats, progressives, and other left-leaning critics of
mens rea reform are right to be skeptical of the motives behind right-wing
criminal justice reform efforts.179 But should skepticism equate to opposing
175 SeeMalcolm, supra note 11, at 279–81.
176 See, e.g., Marc A. Levin, At the State Level, So-Called Crimes Are Here, There,
Everywhere, 28 CRIM. JUST. 4, 5 (2013) (“Excessive criminalization not only leads to
injustice and unfairness, it also deters and even reduces productive activity. The Sarbanes-
Oxley legislation and the labyrinth of rules it has spawned impose criminal penalties for
accounting errors, and has saddled US businesses with an estimated $100 million in
compliance and opportunity costs.”); George F. Will, Eric Garner, Criminalized to Death,




177 Defining the Problem and Scope of Over-Criminalization and Over-Federalization:
Hearing Before the Over-Criminalization Task Force of 2013 of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 113th Cong. 8 (2013).
178 Id.
179 Whether Democrats are right about the actual distributive consequences of mens rea
reform remains an empirical question—we do not know how many more defendants would
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policies supported by the right? Part IV addresses this question by
examining the problematic reasons for and potential social costs of a left
rejection of mens rea reform.
IV. THE LESSONS OFMENS REAREFORM
Ultimately, we might take many lessons from the debates about mens
rea reform. Perhaps this legislative debate indicates the limitations of the
so-called bipartisan consensus on criminal justice reform. Perhaps the
debates are best understood as demonstrating the difficulties of devising a
one-size-fits-all approach to fixing the federal criminal code. Or, perhaps
the debates indicate the challenge of imagining reforms in the abstract,
rather than tying them to individual, controversial cases. But, in this Part, I
argue that there is a more troubling dynamic at play here.
Rather than an individual, idiosyncratic or sui generis policy debate,
the disagreement about mens rea reform illustrates deeper flaws in the
politics, discourse, and study of criminal law.180 In this Part, I trace three
pathologies embodied in the opposition to mens rea reform: (1) the reliance
on criminal law as a regulatory tool to solve otherwise intractable or knotty
social problems; (2) the temptation to “level up” when faced with inequality
(i.e., to punish the powerful party more, rather than to punish the powerless
party less); and (3) the impulse to exceptionalize certain areas of the
criminal system as immune to structural critique or as less deserving of the
skepticism that otherwise pervades much left scholarship and political
discourse.
A. REGULATING THROUGH CRIME
First, the opposition to mens rea reform reflects the continued reliance
on criminal law as the regulatory tool of choice. I don’t mean to suggest
that Senator Warren and other progressives are wrong that Republican
support for mens rea reform stems from a deregulatory impulse. I think
be able to raise a successful defense in a world with heightened mental state requirements,
nor do we know the demographic breakdown of defendants who would benefit from such
legislation.
180 Cf. MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS
INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 238 (2006) (“[W]e should not assume that ‘reform’ means
progressive movement toward some social, economic, or political outcome that tis widely
recognized as necessary and desirable . . . In the case of penal policy, many so-called
reforms of the past resulted in a further consolidation of carceral power and the
legitimization of continued abuses.”).
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they are absolutely right.181 And, that impulse certainly is worrying and
might well speak to broader reasons to be skeptical about the aims and
potential of bipartisan criminal justice reform.182 But why should support
for regulating corporate actors be synonymous with support for expansive
criminal liability? Why should federal prosecutors be the state actors
tasked with curbing the abuses of capital? And, why should advocates who
generally worry about sweeping criminal laws support similar laws that
target their political enemies?
As I have argued elsewhere, progressive reliance on criminalization
may reflect a story of interest group convergence:183 activists and politicians
on the left support some form of regulation and want to see the state address
a given social problem. Activists, politicians, and scholars on the right are
skeptical, if not outright hostile, to regulatory projects that they perceive as
reflecting a “big government” approach to governance. But, there has long
been a carve-out in the right’s stated “de-regulatory” commitments:
criminalization. Despite the neoliberal hostility to government, criminal
law is different.184 Bernard Harcourt describes this phenomenon as
“neoliberal penality.”185 According to Harcourt, since the early 1970s, the
deregulatory impulse in the economic realm has traveled hand-in-hand with
a punitive impulse in the sphere of criminal justice.186 By the logic of
“neoliberal penality,” the state must be good at something—i.e., it must
have some way of justifying its existence in the face of a broader preference
for shrinking government and regulatory apparatuses. After the neoliberal
turn, that “something” is punishment. 187
181 It is worth noting that mens rea reform might not even be necessary to serve
deregulatory ends. Indeed, scholars have observed that courts already tend to read
heightened mens rea requirements into otherwise-silent white-collar crime statutes. See, e.g.,
Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 262–63 (2007)
(“[I]n the context of federal regulatory or white-collar crime prosecutions, federal courts
have a clear pattern of interpreting hundreds of criminal statutes to contain strict mens rea
requirements.”).
182 See generally GOTTSCHALK, supra note 135, at 258–82 (offering a skeptical take on
conservative criminal justice reform).
183 See Benjamin Levin, Guns and Drugs, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2173, 2221–22 (2016).
184 See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS: PUNISHMENT AND
THEMYTH OF NATURAL ORDER 40–44 (2011). (“Neoliberal penality facilitates passing new
criminal statutes and wielding the penal sanction more liberally because that is where
government is necessary, that is where the state can legitimately act, that is the proper and
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So, in periods of political gridlock, where it might be unthinkable for
activists on the left to obtain Republican support for expanding the
regulatory state or the social safety net, all chances for action are not lost.
The left and right converge on a mutually agreeable solution to social
problems: criminalization.188 This is a dynamic that has played out in many
contexts—from gun control, to gender violence and subordination, to the
War on Drugs.189 Despite the equality or justice orientation of these
interventions, scholars have shown that the poor, people of color, sexual
minorities, and other marginalized populations have borne the brunt of
criminal punishment and police intervention.190 And, as Derrick Bell has
shown, moments of “interest convergence” often may advance the interests
of more powerful actors, rather than the weak, the powerless, or the
marginalized.191
In the context of gun control, for example, some of the harshest
sentencing schemes and least forgiving possession laws received bipartisan
support (even attracting support from the National Rifle Association).192
James Forman, Jr. has recounted how, in Washington DC, black activists on
the left ultimately acquiesced to a range of tough-on-crime policies to
address gun violence.193 Similarly, Project Exile, a 1990s program in
188 See Levin, supra note 183, at 2192.
189 See, e.g., FORMAN, supra note 12, at 12–13; see generally Kimberlé Crenshaw,
Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of
Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991); Janet Halley et al., From the International to the
Local in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/sex Work, and Sex Trafficking:
Four Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 335, 340
(2006); Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2, 70 (2006).
190 See, e.g., FORMAN, supra note 12; Crenshaw, supra note 139; Bonita R.
Gardner, Separate and Unequal: Federal Tough-on-Guns Program Targets Minority
Communities for Selective Enforcement, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 305, 317 (2007); Aya
Gruber, Equal Protection Under the Carceral State, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1337, 1365–66
(2018):
A poignant example is domestic violence reform, where feminists’ interest in fair
treatment of female victims converged with prosecutors’ interest in punishing
batterers, resulting in punitive policies that actually devalued and materially harmed
women. Lawmakers’ and other state actors’ receptivity to disparity claims vary by
their interests, and the criminal arena is one in which punitive interests are ascendant.
Id.
191 See Derrick A. Bell, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND
THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 165–79 (2004).
192 See, e.g., FORMAN, supra note 12, at 47–78 (describing the politics of gun control
among black community activists in Washington D.C.); Levin, Guns and Drugs, supra note
183 (describing statutes and policies that received bipartisan support).
193 See FORMAN, supra note 12, at 47–78.
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Richmond Virginia that funneled gun offenders into federal court where
they would be subjected to lengthy mandatory minimum sentences, was so
popular on both sides of the aisle that Democrats and Republicans fought to
take credit for it in the lead up to the 1996 presidential election.194 And, as
scholars have shown, Project Exile and similar provisions have been used
disproportionately against defendants of color.195 That is, in an effort to
help predominantly low-income communities of color, a turn to criminal
law simply reinscribed the racial hierarchies of mass incarceration.
Certainly, it’s fair to ask whether activists on the left would have preferred
heavy civil regulations on gun sellers and manufacturers to this harsh
criminal alternative. But what we saw instead was a bipartisan embrace of
carceral politics.
Similar dynamics have played out in other contexts where criminal
law has become the operative vehicle for addressing structural inequality.
As Jeannie Suk Gersen, Aya Gruber, Janet Halley, and others have shown,
the move by feminist activists and scholars to embrace harsh punitive
responses to gender violence has exacerbated troubling distributional
inequities.196 Rather than empowering women victimized by gendered
subordination, many of these policies (mandatory no-drop policies,
preferences for pretrial detention, etc.) have empowered prosecutors and
further contributed to the hyper-policing and hyper-incarceration of poor
people of color and defendants from marginalized communities.197 Indeed,
194 See Levin, Guns and Drugs, supra note 183, at 2207–09; David E. Patton, Guns,
Crime Control, and a Systemic Approach to Federal Sentencing, 32 CARDOZO L. REV.
1427, 1447–48 (2011).
195 See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 190, at 317 (“According to statistics presented in the
Eastern District of Michigan, almost ninety percent of those prosecuted under Project Safe
Neighborhoods are African American . . .And under Project Exile in Richmond, Virginia, the
defendant and prosecution stipulated in an Eastern District case that ‘as many as 90 percent
of the defendants prosecuted under Project Exile are African American.’” (footnotes
omitted)); Levin, Guns and Drugs, supra note 183, at 2193–98; Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit
Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity: Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and
the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L.J. 2, 30 (2013).
196 See, e.g., JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK
FROM FEMINISM (2008); JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW: HOW THE DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE REVOLUTION IS TRANSFORMING PRIVACY (2009); Aya Gruber, Neofeminism,
50 HOUS. L. REV. 1325 (2013); Leigh Goodmark, Should Domestic Violence Be
Decriminalized?, 40 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 53, 55 (2017); Alice Ristroph, Criminal Law in
the Shadow of Violence, 62 ALA. L. REV. 571, 602 (2011).
197 See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 139; Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home,
116 YALE L.J. 2, 8 (2006) (“And perhaps unsurprisingly, this phenomenon is thoroughly
class-contingent because it largely affects poor urban minorities and immigrants.”); Tara
Urs, Coercive Feminism, 46 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 85, 86 (2014); Claire
Houston, How Feminist Theory Became (Criminal) Law: Tracing the Path to Mandatory
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faced with the troubling dynamics of police- and prosecutor-driven
responses to gender violence, a wave of left activists has pushed for non-
criminal alternatives as a model for protecting victims of intimate partner
violence and for responding to various forms of subordination.198
These are only two examples, but the dynamic recurs elsewhere.
Sometimes, activists on the left may support criminal solutions
vociferously.199 Other times, criminal law might be a desired adjunct to
other social policies.200 But, whatever the dynamic, progressives,
Democrats, and other voices on the (broadly conceived) left continue to rely
on criminal law as a vehicle to advance their ends.
This dynamic should trouble critics of mass incarceration and
supporters of left or redistributionist policies. To the extent that the
criminal system is so structurally flawed, why should we trust it to serve
left/progressive ends?201 Across lines of gender, race, class, and sexuality,
this critique has been voiced powerfully.202 Without resetting the power
dynamics and structures that define the criminal system, how can we trust
Criminal Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases, 21 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 217, 270
(2014).
198 See, e.g., The Critical Resistance INCITE! Statement on Gender Violence and the
Prison Industrial Complex, in ABOLITION NOW!: TEN YEARS OF STRATEGY AND
STRUGGLE AGAINST THE PRISON INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 15 (The CR10 Publications
Collective, eds. 2008); Donna K. Coker, Shifting Power for Battered Women: Law, Material
Resources, and Poor Women of Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009, 1046 (2000);
Goodmark, supra note 196, at 58; Angela P. Harris, Heteropatriarchy Kills: Challenging
Gender Violence in a Prison Nation, 37 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 13, 38 (2011); Survived
and Punished: End the Criminalization of Survivors of Domestic and Sexual Violence,
SURVIVED & PUNISHED, http://www.survivedandpunished.org [http://perma.cc/VEB4-
25EF].
199 See generally Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L.
REV. 581 (2009) (tracking feminist support for stronger criminal regulation of sexual
assault).
200 See FORMAN, supra note 12, at 12–13 (arguing that black activists in the late 1960s
supported some harsh criminal policies, but did so alongside calls for state intervention in
other areas—an imagined “Marshall Plan for the cities”); Elizabeth Hinton, Julilly Kohler-
Hausmann, & Vesla M. Weaver, Opinion, Did Blacks Really Endorse the 1994 Crime Bill?,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2016, at A25 (“Policy makers pointed to black support for greater
punishment and surveillance, without recognizing accompanying demands to redirect power
and economic resources to low-income minority communities.”).
201 See Ely Aharonson, ”Pro-Minority” Criminalization and the Transformation of
Visions of Citizenship in Contemporary Liberal Democracies: A Critique, 13 NEW CRIM. L.
REV. 286, 287 (2010).
202 See, e.g., Aziza Ahmed, When Men Are Harmed: Feminism, Queer Theory, and
Torture at Abu Ghraib, 11 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 1, 5 (2012); Gruber, supra note
199 (arguing that “criminal law historically enforced and entrenched racial, gender, and
socio-economic hierarchies”); Suk, supra note 189, at 70.
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the institutions of criminal law to right deeper social wrongs?203 If we find
critiques of the carceral state and mass incarceration as a means of
controlling marginalized populations compelling, how does it make sense to
grow those institutions and task them with serving the interests of the same
populations that they repeatedly harm? Given the current distributive
realities of criminal law and its enforcement, why should we assume that
mens rea reform would only benefit rich, white defendants (or, conversely,
that a strict liability regime would not harm marginalized defendants)?204
Even if we were convinced that strict liability serves to redistribute liability
in an unjust society,205 we must recognize that the actors enforcing criminal
law are the same police, prosecutors, and judges who preside over the
deeply unequal and unjust institutions of mass incarceration.
All of which is to ask, why should criminal law be the operative
vehicle through which to achieve left redistributionist ends?206 This is and
was the core insight of the overcriminalization literature, long before it
became the province of the libertarian right—just because there is a
problem in need of fixing, it doesn’t mean that the fix should come in the
form of another criminal statute or another prosecution.207 Maybe if society
could resituate political and social power such that prosecutors and
lawmakers represented the wishes of marginalized populations, then such
203 Cf. Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of Legal Argument, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 75, 97-
103 (1991) (describing “the reproduction, within a doctrinal solution to a problem, of the
policy conflict the solution was supposed to settle”).
204 See supra note 179.
205 See supra notes 170–173, and accompanying text.
206 There may be some degree of “American exceptionalism” in the way criminal law
has been used to address the perceived criminality of capital. In his comparative analysis of
criminal policies in Europe and the United States, James Whitman emphasizes different
approaches to white-collar crime on both sides of the Atlantic. See WHITMAN, supra note
130, at 80–82. While corporate crime became a source of concern in France and Germany in
the 1970s and 1980s, the reaction there never became as harsh or punitive as in the States. Id.
at 81. “Uncomfortable with the idea of inflicting ordinary criminal punishments,” Whitman
explains, “the French system . . . developed a whole class of special mild
punishments . . . called ‘criminal administrative sanctions’ . . . .” Id.
207 See, e.g., Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 7 AM. CRIM. L. Q.
17, 33 (1968–69):
The plain sense that the criminal law is a highly specialized tool of social control,
useful for certain purposes but not for others; that when improperly used it is capable
of producing more evil than good; that the decision to criminalize any particular
behavior must follow only after an assessment and balancing of gains and losses-this
obvious injunction of rationality has been noted widely for over 250 years.
Id.
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concerns would be less well-founded.208 But that would require a massive
reorganization of political power and a massive readjustment of
institutional incentives. In the meantime, it’s worth asking why or how
criminal law might be the right answer.
Perhaps, simply, the answer is that criminal law is the most (or only)
feasible regulatory option. Thinking back to the gun control example, if
scholars and activists view a range of problems as pressing and don’t see
any other regulatory apparatus as feasible, criminal law might be the way to
address the issue. In her work on corporate crime, Miriam Baer offers an
account of this turn to punishment over non- (or less-explicitly) punitive
regulatory options.209 Baer suggests not only that there is a baseline
political economy story, but also that punishment enjoys significant
psychological and rhetorical advantages over “regulation”: punishment is
easier for the public to understand than regulation; punishment offers
flexibility to state actors because it is hard to determine how much
punishment is sufficient; and punishment is “public” in ways that
regulation, which appears more similar to “private” causes of action, is
not.210
Notably, though, the criminal turn that Baer describes in the context of
corporate regulation strongly resembles a phenomenon largely not
associated with white-collar crime: “governing through crime.”211 The
theory, articulated by Jonathon Simon, rests on a similar, but more radical,
insight than the one that drives overcriminalization research: when faced
with a problem, the state identifies a threat or crisis, and then reacts by
criminalizing conduct or resorting to state violence.212 As Simon puts it,
“When we govern through crime, we make crime and the forms of
knowledge historically associated with it—criminal law, popular crime
narrative, and criminology—available outside their limited original subject
domains as powerful tools with which to interpret and frame all forms of
social action as a problem for governance.”213 Viewed through this frame,
208 See R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 197 (2001) (“We
should, of course, do what we can to work towards a restructuring of society that would
transform it into a genuine, inclusive liberal community . . . But such restructuring takes
time—decades, if not lifetimes.”). But see Bernard Harcourt, Matrioshka Dolls, in TRACEY
L. MEARES & DAN KAHAN, URGENT TIMES: POLICING AND RIGHTS IN INNER-CITY
COMMUNITIES 87 (1999) (arguing that political power imbalances complicate framings of
marginalized populations).
209 See generallyMiriam H. Baer, Choosing Punishment, 92 B.U. L. REV. 577 (2012).
210 See id. at 581.
211 See generally SIMON, supra note 16.
212 See id. at 17.
213 Id.
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it’s easy to see mens rea reform opponents’ rhetoric as rooted in the
language of fear-of-crime that, in turn, justifies the harshest of remedies:
capitalism (or “Wall Street”) is out of control and must be reined in to solve
the crisis in U.S. inequality.
Whatever the explanation for the punitive turn, in the mens rea reform
context, there should be at least three concerns. First and foremost, the fact
that there’s a problem needn’t justify any solution. Indeed, that line of
thinking (i.e., social problems require solutions, whatever the cost) has
helped drive mass incarceration and has thrown fuel on the fire of tough-on-
crime politics. For “doing something” in response to a problem to mean
resorting to criminal law, scholars and activists should consider the costs of
that turn. 214 Scholars of the criminal system have shown repeatedly how
such costs have been disregarded, leading to our current, bloated carceral
state. Just because the politics of mens rea reform look different than the
politics of three-strikes laws, the War on Drugs, or other often-
conservative-backed endeavors, this turn to criminal law should not be
exempt from a similar critical eye.
Second, it’s not at all clear that criminal law is a necessary or desirable
way to address corporate malfeasance or bad conduct by affluent
defendants. In our contemporary criminal system, incarceration is treated
as the default model for or means of punishment—i.e., if defendants do
something bad, society’s response is generally to cage them (or, in some
cases to impose another form of state control with the threat of
incarceration lurking in the background).215 Therefore, it’s reasonable to
conclude that the implicit position of many mens rea reform opponents is
that individuals who commit white-collar crime (or other crimes currently
targeted by reform legislation) belong in prison. Indeed, Senator Warren’s
report, Rigged Justice: 2016 How Weak Enforcement Lets Corporate
Offenders Off Easy, explicitly invokes incarceration—and the failure to
incarcerate—as the stakes of mens rea reform debates.216 The cover page of
the report, which addresses and critiques mens rea reform proposals, shows
214 Cf. Miriam Baer, Sorting Out White Collar Crime, 127 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming
2019) (describing many criminal statutes passed during the spike in criminalization as
“represent[ing] ‘cheap’ political reactions to singular events or scandals of the day”).
215 See, e.g., Mark A.R. Kleiman, Substituting Effective Community Supervision for
Incarceration, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1621, 1621 (2015) (“The default punishment in the current
American system is incarceration.”); Alternatives to Incarceration, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 1863, 1869 (1998) (“[I]ncarceration is now the default and bedrock of the American
criminal justice system.”).
216 RIGGED JUSTICE, supra note 159.
536 LEVIN [Vol. 109
the open door to a jail or prison cell.217 The implication is not that white-
collar defendants are failing to pay fines or restitution; it is that they have
escaped from the cages where they belong.218
In a moment where incarceration as a model is subject to heavy
criticism, it’s fair to ask why we should be sanguine about embracing this
narrative of mens rea reform as keeping bad actors out of prison.219 I will
hold off on addressing this question at length until Section C, but it is worth
asking here why prison and not some other response.220 That is, if we
imagined a different criminal model whereby restitution or some other non-
carceral punishment were the norm, the conversation might be different.
(Indeed, one possible way to exceptionalize white-collar crime from other
corners of the criminal system is the probability of meaningful non-carceral
penalties.)221 That said, Senator Warren and others on the left clearly
embrace the language of incarceration when objecting to mens rea reform
efforts.
So, that leaves us with the question of “why prison”? If we turn to the
commonly accepted purposes of punishment (rehabilitation, incapacitation,
deterrence, and retribution)222 the answer isn’t obvious.223 From a
rehabilitationist standpoint, U.S. prisons are an abject failure—considering
the well-documented instances of abuse in prison and the vast web of
collateral consequences that await the formerly incarcerated, it has become
extremely difficult to justify a sentence in terms of rehabilitation.224 From
217 See id. at 1.
218 Prosecutors might pursue other ends rather than incarceration of corporate executives
(or even restitution or fines). See Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA.
L. REV. 853, 855 (2007).
219 And, incarceration isn’t even that common in many types of high-profile white-collar
prosecutions. See GARRETT, supra note 130, at 13–14.
220 Cf. id. at 137–40 (discussing the role of civil suits in compensating victims of
corporate crime).
221 See Patricia M. Jones, Sentencing, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 879, 900 (1987) (“Fines
are the traditionally favored mode of white-collar deterrence”).
222 See, e.g., United States v. Beasley, 12 F.3d 280, 283 (1st Cir. 1993) (identifying “the
basic purposes of punishment”); Michael Tonry, Purposes and Functions of Sentencing,
34 CRIME & JUST. 1, 6 (2006) (“Generally when people discuss the
‘purposes’ of punishment, they refer to normative rationales such as retribution or crime
prevention through deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and moral education.”).
223 For a more thorough analysis in the broader context of corporate crime, see SAMUEL
W. BUELL, CAPITALOFFENSES: BUSINESS CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA’S CORPORATE
AGE 213–23 (2016).
224 See, e.g., Joy Radice, The Reintegrative State, 66 EMORY L.J. 1315, 1327 (2017)
(“The rehabilitative ideal was, rightly or wrongly, seen as a failed endeavor . . . ”); James
Gilligan, Opinion, Punishment Fails. Rehabilitation Works, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2012),
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an incapacitationist perspective, the issue is whether a defendant must be
incarcerated in order to protect the public from future wrong-doing.
Therefore, the question becomes whether people or corporate actors that
violate strict liability statutes are a danger to the public such that they must
be incarcerated to prevent future harm.225 It is worth noting that
incapacitation is frequently recognized as a driving force in the growth of
mass incarceration,226 and relying on actuarial predictions of future
wrongdoing not only implicates a range of cultural biases (across axes of
race, gender, class, etc.),227 it also invites a default to incarceration when
other responses might be sufficient.228
Deterrence can be seen as providing one of the best justifications for
incarcerating white-collar defendants and/or defendants who fall afoul of
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/12/18/prison-could-be-
productive/punishment-fails-rehabilitation-works [http://perma.cc/92ZB-6HEW].
225 Cf. DARIO MELOSSI & MASSIMO PAVARINI, THE PRISON AND THE FACTORY (40th
Anniversary Edition) 261 (“The prison, and the penal system in general, can be useful in
governing and reducing crime only if enabled to select and neutralize those whom the social
system cannot include or feels unable to include.”).
226 See, e.g., Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the
Emerging Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 449 (1992);
Sharon Dolovich, Confronting the Costs of Incarceration: Foreword: Incarceration
American-Style, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 237, 252–54 (2009); Mona Lynch, Waste
Managers? The New Penology, Crime Fighting, and Parole Agent Identity, 32 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 839, 839 (1998) (“[O]ver the past few decades, a systems analysis approach to
danger management has come to dominate criminal justice administration, and they suggest
that the penal enterprise may well be evolving into a ‘waste management’ system rather than
a normalizing or rehabilitative one.”).
227 See, e.g., BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING,
AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE (2006); Jessica M. Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism
Risk, 67 EMORY L.J. 59, 62–63 (2017) (“Critics oppose risk-based sentencing as a matter of
fairness. They contend that, because risk tools rely on factors like gender or proxies for race,
using the tools at sentencing is impermissible as a matter of constitutionality or bad
policy.”); Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490, 495–96 (2018)
(“[T]he turn to actuarial risk assessment has engendered both excitement and apprehension,
but criticism has centered on its potential to exacerbate race and class inequalities”); Sonja
B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination,
66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 817 (2014).
228 Cf. GEORG RUSCHE & OTTO KIRCHEIMER, PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 207
(1939, 1967)
The futility of severe punishment and cruel treatment may be proven a thousand
times, but so long as society is unable to solve its social problems, repression, the
easy way out, will always be accepted. It provides the illusion of security by covering
the symptoms of social disease with a system of legal and moral value judgments.
Id.
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strict liability statutes.229 Indeed, Senator Warren identifies “deter[ring]
future criminal activity” as one of the primary reasons to enforce corporate
criminal laws.230 But, the empirical evidence on the efficacy of
incarceration’s deterrent effect is questionable.231 And, it’s not clear why
prison (as opposed to non-carceral responses, such as large fines or
restorative-justice-inflected remedies) would provide a greater deterrent
effect.232 That leaves us with retribution. And maybe that’s the best
229 See, e.g., Miriam H. Baer, Linkage and the Deterrence of Corporate Fraud, 94 VA.
L. REV. 1295, 1314 (2008) (“[I]f any group is likely to be deterred by increased criminal
sanctions, it is the white collar criminals who perpetrate fraud.”); Jones, supra note 221 at
899 (“Because the white-collar criminal poses little threat to public safety, and rehabilitation
is arguably a secondary sentencing purpose, punishment and deterrence form the primary
bases for the white-collar sentence.”) (footnotes omitted); Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1224 (1985) (“Because criminal
sanctions are so costly, they have to be set at levels that do not deter everyone, but it does
not follow that a person who is not deterred is not a wrongdoer. He is just someone for
whom criminal activity is utility maximizing. As for strict liability, it will deter, by inducing
a change in activity level.”); Daniel Richman, Federal White Collar Sentencing in the
United States: A Work in Progress, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 65 (2013) (focusing
on the role of deterrence in white-collar enforcement).
230 RIGGED JUSTICE, supra note 159, at 1. In full, the report states that: “Strong
enforcement of corporate criminal laws serves similar goals: to deter future criminal activity
by making would-be lawbreakers think twice before breaking the law and, sometimes, by
helping victims recover from their injuries.” Id. (emphasis added). Interestingly, deterrence
is framed as the primary objective and restitution appears to be little more than a possible
side effect. This characterization of the social function of corporate criminal law raises
important questions about how radical, transformative, or redistributionist white-collar
prosecutions can be. If the reason to prosecute corporate actors (and, importantly, to hold
them strictly liable) is as a means of redistributing wealth or spreading loss, then it would
seem that restitution would be the desired outcome of most prosecutions. If, instead,
prosecutions are designed to achieve deterrence via prison time, then this redistributionist
goal appears much less clear. (Or, at least, much less clearly advanced.) Certainly, holding a
corporate defendant strictly liable might discipline capital and, by extension, curb the sorts
of excesses or exploitative practices that drive inequality. But, absent restitution or
something resembling restorative justice, a prosecution under a strict liability framework
appears to empower the state and prosecutors more than the victims.
231 See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, Is Deterrence Relevant in Sentencing White-Collar
Criminals?, 61 WAYNE L. REV. 27, 48 (2015) (arguing that white-collar defendants appear
to be relatively immune from the deterrent effect of criminal punishment); Elizabeth
Szockyj, Imprisoning White-Collar Criminals?, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 485, 493 (1999) (“There
is lukewarm support for the position that criminal penalties effectively deter corporate
crime.”).
232 Another way of thinking about this deterrence-based argument is through the lens of
expressivism or public education. That is, perhaps the purpose of the prosecution is not
simply to deter corporate actors from behaving badly, but is also to send a message about
social values. See, e.g., ÉMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 102 (W.D.
Halls trans., 2014) (1893); MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH 138 (Alan Sheridan
trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995). Whether the idea is that no one is above the law or that
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justification for defaulting to prison. The defendants whom Senator Warren
and other reform opponents identify have done harm: financial,
environmental, or otherwise. But, doesn’t our current moment of mass
incarceration show us the costs of responding to wrongs in this way? That
is, if retribution is compelling here, it is compelling for the same reason that
tough-on-crime politicians and activists have been able to amp up
punishments and grow the criminal code for the last half century.
Third and finally, opponents of mens rea reform should have to reckon
with the reality of a legal framework in which Congress drafts sloppy laws
and then defers—with courts’ blessings—to the power and judgment of
prosecutors.233 There’s a temptation to frame mens rea reform debates as
arguments between criminal prosecution for corporate defendants on the
one hand and no prosecution on the other. Or, more pointedly, there’s a
tendency to frame the debates as between a world of strict liability for
corporate crime on the one hand, and a world without strict liability on the
other. To be clear, even if those are the aspirations of mens rea reform
proponents, no proposed legislation goes anywhere near that far. The
argument is simply whether Congress should have to specify when it wants
a statute to impose strict liability. Rather than criminalization versus
decriminalization, the question actually comes down to how criminalization
occurs.234 That is, even if opponents were to conclude that the benefits of
industry should be unable to harm individuals and communities with impunity, this
expressivist or Durkheimian account would suggest that the prosecution sends a message.
Other legal liability—whether through tort or a civil regulatory action—might do some
work, but it wouldn’t bear the same social significance and wouldn’t mark the conduct as
truly unacceptable. If that’s the argument animating opposition to mens rea reform—and
Senator Warren’s rhetoric suggests as much—then there are assumptions worth unpacking.
Most importantly, if this account is about legitimacy and public values, then should it matter
what punishment looks like? If criminal law and prosecutors are supposed to serve as the
moral compass for society, shouldn’t it matter that many commentators view the criminal
system as deeply immoral? See, e.g., Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It Is
Supposed to: The Limits of Criminal Justice Reform, 104 GEO. L.J. 1419 (2016) (arguing
that the injustice of the contemporary system is not an aberration but a sign of the system’s
core function in preserving racial hierarchy); Abbe Smith, Can You Be A Good Person and A
Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 355, 396 (2001) (“My answer to the question,
‘Can You Be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?’, is now probably evident. But, let me
say it plainly and then attempt to address some of the objections to my position. My answer
is both harsh and tempered: I hope so, but I think not.”).
233 See Stuntz, supra note 6, at 528 (“Legislators gain when they write criminal statutes
in ways that benefit prosecutors. Prosecutors gain from statutes that enable them more easily
to induce guilty pleas.”).
234 In this respect, some of the bigger questions about the social desirability or utility of
using criminal law to regulate corporate actors fall outside of the space of this Article. Those
are major questions that have generated a rich scholarly discourse. See, e.g., Baer, supra note
209; Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Law’s Unfortunate Triumph over Administrative Law, 7
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criminalization outweighed the costs, that needn’t compel a conclusion that
any criminal law would be justified.
Given the well-trod critiques of the criminal law and of prosecutorial
discretion,235 why should Senator Warren and other pro-criminalization
progressives willingly endorse and protect a particularly problematic
criminalization framework? Yes, passing mens rea reform might mean
forcing a new set of legislative fights over what conduct to criminalize,
effectively immunizing bad actors in the interim. But, refusing to go
through that process and instead accepting a status quo in which judges and
prosecutors must work together to smooth over gaps in the law should be
concerning to anyone who values defendants’ rights or who worries
generally about the expansive nature of criminal laws.
B. LEVELLING UP
Not only does the critique of mens rea reform demonstrate the
intractability of regulating through crime, it also reflects a troubling
impulse to “level up” or “equalize up.”236 That is, when faced with the
specter of inequality (wealthy corporate defendants receiving more
protections than poor defendants), opponents of mens rea reform have made
the move to level up punishment and prosecution.237
The tendency to “level up” has haunted the literature and activism of
inequality in the criminal law.238 Most critics of the criminal system have
come to decry its fundamental inequality and excessive punitiveness.239
J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 657 (2011); Coffee, supra note 171. That said, it is worth recognizing
that the failure to bring a successful prosecution needn’t vitiate other regulatory options. See
generally Baer, supra note 209 (discussing these tradeoffs).
235 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN.
L. REV. 989, 1044 (2006); Paul Butler, Starr Is to Clinton As Regular Prosecutors Are to
Blacks, 40 B.C. L. REV. 705, 705 (1999); Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The
Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 17 (1998).
236 Cf. Gruber, supra note 190, at 1364–83 (describing and critiquing the “level up”
approach).
237 Cf. JESSE EISINGER, THE CHICKENSHIT CLUB: WHY THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
FAILS TO PROSECUTE EXECUTIVES (2017) (linking the rise of income inequality in the
United States to federal prosecutors’ failure to aggressively enforce criminal laws).
238 See Gruber, supra note 190, at 1364–83.
239 See, e.g., Shima Baradaran, Race, Prediction, and Discretion, 81 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 157, 160 (2013); Ian F. Haney López, Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and
Mass Incarceration in the Age of Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1023 (2010); Alice
Ristroph, Desert, Democracy, and Sentencing Reform, 96 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1293, 1333 (2006) (“Criminal law scholars often acknowledge that
our criminal justice system is riddled with inequality”); David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race,
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According to Senator Warren, there are two justice systems—one reserved
for the rich, powerful defendant.240 Relatedly, Sasha Natapoff suggests that
the criminal legal system operates as a sort of pyramid—at the top (where
affluent defendants reside), due process and “rule of law” are meaningful
institutions; at the bottom (where poor defendants are processed via a
system of mass misdemeanors and social control), procedural protections
are largely absent or meaningless.241 Michelle Alexander argues that the
criminal law has come to resemble mass incarceration as a means of
excising black people from social and political life,242 and a range of
sociologists, criminologists, and legal scholars has tracked the ways in
which policing and punishment systematically disadvantage people of color
and other socially marginalized groups.243 Assuming the accuracy of this
critique, what is the appropriate policy response?
Bryan Stevenson, the founder of the Equal Justice Initiative, famously
tells the story of the strangest motion that he ever filed. Representing a
black, fourteen-year-old boy faced with a life sentence in Alabama,
Stevenson filed a “Motion to Treat My 14 Year-Old Client As a 75 year
Old, White, Privileged Corporate Executive.”244 Needless to say,
Stevenson lost on the motion. But the argument speaks to a deep, dark, and
increasingly accepted reality of the U.S. legal system: inequality runs
rampant. Despite lofty declarations of equal rights, equal opportunity, and
equal access to justice, “equality” remains illusory. Across every
conceivable axis of power, distributions of resources, influence, voice, and
opportunity remain tremendously skewed.245 Recognizing inequality,
and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1316 (1995); William J. Stuntz, Unequal
Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 1997 (2008).
240 See Bowman, supra note 158.
241 See Alexandra Natapoff, The Penal Pyramid, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE
THINKING 33 (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds., 2017).
242 See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 12.
243 See, e.g., DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDINGWORK IN AN ERA
OF MASS INCARCERATION (2007) (examining the role of race and criminal records in
enforcing the terms of social exclusion from the labor market); WACQUANT, supra note 12;
WESTERN, supra note 12; Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass
Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271 (2004).
244 Bryan Stevenson, We Need To Talk About an Injustice, TED TALK (Mar. 2012),
https://www.ted.com/talks/bryan_stevenson_we_need_to_talk_about_an_injustice
[http://perma.cc/68YL-9ARN].
245 See, e.g., THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY (Arthur
Goldhammer trans., Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 2014) (tracing the rise of income
inequality).
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though, need not compel a specific policy response.246 Instead, the question
remains how do we react when faced with the harsh reality of inequality?
Should the judge have “leveled down” when it came time to punish and
treated Stevenson’s fourteen-year-old client like the rich white man? Or,
should the legal system “level up” and treat rich white men more like poor
black children, exposing them to the ugly realities of the carceral state?
If the problem is substantive (i.e., the way poor people, people of
color, and other marginalized populations are treated in the criminal
system), then the solution seems as though it might be to treat the poor
defendant of color like the rich white defendant. If the problem is simply
the formal inequality itself rather than something substantive (i.e., the
treatment of disadvantaged or socially marginalized defendants), the
problem could be solved by equalizing in either direction.247 Treating the
rich white defendant like the poor black defendant would solve the problem
just as effectively as treating the poor black defendant like the rich white
defendant.
As Aya Gruber puts it:
In recent years, as evidence has amassed of the inherently racially biased nature of
criminal punishment, even the most liberal lawmakers have found themselves in a
state of perpetual cognitive dissonance . . . . [T]hey recognize that criminal
prosecution and punishment is about far more than individual culpability—it is about
power, race, socioeconomic status, and other inequalities. At the same time . . . they
struggle with how or whether this structural objection should affect the prosecution
and punishment of guilty individual offenders, particularly violent criminals and
rapists.248
In other words, “[t]o the extent that the American penal state is
constitutively racist, formal equality efforts to treat minority victims fairly
by leveling up punishment can end up undermining larger substantive racial
equality in society.”249
246 See, e.g., Gruber, supra note 190, at 1364–83 (tracking different possible responses);
Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme
Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388 (1988) (embracing a harsher or more punitive response to
inequality).
247 See, e.g., Gruber, supra note 190, at 1363–66 (“To some, eliminating whatever
individual disparity they encounter through whatever means is an end in itself—and the end
of the story.”); Levin, supra note 1 (using the example of enforcing drug laws more harshly
against white defendants as a “levelling up” solution to racial inequality in the War on
Drugs).
248 Gruber, supra note 190, at 1364 (citing James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass
Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21 (2012)).
249 Id. at 1366.
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Applying this logic, the instinct to level or equalize up is a dangerous
one—rather than addressing substantive issues or working towards a system
in which all are treated well, it legitimates the exact same abuses that are so
objectionable when leveled against the marginalized defendant. This
approach superficially fixes the problem of inequality, but it does nothing to
address the substantive and structural evils faced by the disadvantaged
defendant.250 If these are fundamental structural problems with prison,
police, prosecutorial discretion, or even with the deeper social, political, or
economic forces that undergird the criminal law, it’s not clear how
exposing more people to injustice is the best response.251
250 See Kate Levine, How We Prosecute the Police, 104 GEO. L.J. 745, 776 (2016)
(“This realization has led many to call for less process for police. This Article has argued
that the far more desirable conclusion is to give more process to the rest of us. Anyone
serious about criminal justice reform needs to consider how prosecutors treat police
suspects. The process they give their law enforcement partners has much to tell us about how
to create a better system for everyone.”).
251 One prevalent response to this call for “levelling down” sounds in the language of
identification and empathy. According to this line of reasoning, more people—particularly
powerful or privileged people—should be forced to experience the criminal system. That is,
such an argument goes, one problem with our current system is that many people have no
exposure with criminal law or law enforcement; these people—often more affluent white
voters—are unable to identify with individuals and communities deeply affected by mass
incarceration or tough-on-crime policies. SeeWilliam J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of
Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 783 (2006). By increasing the likelihood that
more privileged people (or, everyone) has contact with the criminal system, perhaps we
might alter what Stuntz describes as the “pathological politics of criminal law” and force
voters and members of the polity to recognize that they, too, are potential defendants. See
Daniel Epps, The Consequences of Error in Criminal Justice, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1065,
1103–04 (2015) (“By making it harder to punish, the Blackstone principle concentrates
criminal punishment on a more discrete group of people. And it makes the group of people
being punished less politically attractive, because it ensures that a higher percentage of them
will be guilty (or at least seen as guilty). We should thus expect the Blackstone principle to
increase political tolerance for harsh treatment of convicted criminals.”).
A discussion of this response falls largely outside the scope of this Article, but two
objections are worth noting: First, the identification-based argument for levelling up rests on
an empirical assumption—that forcing people to experience the indignities of policing,
prosecution, and punishment would lead those same people to become more sympathetic to
criminal defendants. I remain skeptical. Borrowing from social cognition theory, legal
scholars have argued that many policy decisions are shaped by the “fundamental attribution
error”—a tendency to view our own bad conduct as “mistakes” caused by situational factors,
while we view others’ bad conduct as blameworthy and the result of some dispositional
flaw. See, e.g., Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist
Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1, 25 (2004); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of
Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1565 (2005); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our
Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment
Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1205 (1995). That is, there is good evidence to suggest
that people might still have a difficult time identifying with other defendants. And, similarly,
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Bobby Waldrop’s prosecution in Alabama serves as a chilling
illustration of what an unrestrained “levelling up” solution to inequality
might look like. Waldrop, a white man, was convicted of three counts of
capital murder in 1998.252 After trial and a sentencing hearing, the jury
voted 10-2 in favor of recommending a life sentence.253 The trial judge,
however, overrode the jury’s recommendation and sentenced Waldrop to
death.254 On the record, the judge concluded that the aggravating factors
outweighed the mitigating factors, thus justifying a death sentence.255
Then, in a hearing to reweigh the factors, the judge stated: “If I had not
imposed the death sentence, I would have sentenced three black people to
death and no white people.”256 In short, the court’s reasoning turned the
logic of death penalty opponents on its head—a concern about dramatic
racial disparities in the capital context could be addressed by levelling up,
rather than levelling down or confronting the actual racial injustices in the
administration of the death penalty.
The Waldrop death sentence (which was affirmed by the Eleventh
Circuit)257 also throws Stevenson’s “levelling down” motion into stark
relief. Both cases were decided by courts in a state (Alabama) with a long
history of racial injustice. And, both cases forced judges to confront that
legacy of racial injustice and its contemporary role in the inequality of the
criminal system. Yet, the Stevenson motion was rejected out of hand.258
And Stevenson himself speaks of the motion as clearly absurd.259 It’s not
other issues of identity (race, class, gender, sexuality, etc.) might continue to make certain
defendants less sympathetic and might allow for an identification of certain defendants as
more deserving of punishment, less remorseful, etc. Second, even putting the empirical
question aside, there is an even bigger question of whether anyone should suffer the
indignities associated with mass incarceration. For scholars and advocates who are skeptical
of the structures and institutions that comprise the carceral state, the answer might well be
“no.” See generally Allegra M. McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA
L. REV. 1156 (2015). Or, even if we are ambivalent about that question of first principles,
there might well be means of building broader social or cultural identification with criminal
defendants that do not require embracing the prosecutorial and punitive model. See generally
Simonson, supra note 131 (embracing a model of criminal procedure that would empower
the “community” to support and assist criminal defendants).
252 Waldrop v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 711 F. App’x 900, 902 (11th Cir. 2017).
253 Id. at 904.
254 Id.
255 Id. at 904–05.
256 Id. at 916.
257 See generally id.
258 Stevenson, supra note 244.
259 Stevenson describes it as a “crazy motion.” Id. Of course, Stevenson and other racial
justice advocates view the Waldrop judge’s statement and reasoning as similarly absurd. See,
e.g., EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, EJI Challenges Death Sentence Infected by Racial Bias and
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that judges and other official actors are blind to racial inequality. It’s that
the recognized means of addressing inequality—at least in the criminal
space—tends to involve levelling up. As Gruber puts it, “Viewing the ‘fear
of too much justice’ as a fear of leniency indicates that legal
decisionmakers are often more sanguine about discrimination claims when
they can address them through greater penal severity and without color
conscious social engineering.” 260
By way of a less dramatic example, Kate Levine has addressed the
procedures available to police officers when they are prosecuted; Levine
argues that officers generally receive significantly better treatment than
non-officer defendants, particularly poor defendants of color.261 Levine
similarly argues that an impulse to level up is a mistake; rather, critics and
commentators should view the treatment of officer-defendants as a model
for other, less privileged or powerful defendants.262 Rather than decrying
the power and privilege of a defendant and using that power to justify
otherwise unjust or flawed institutions, Levine argues, advocates for
socially marginalized defendants should seek to leverage the treatment of
the privileged defendant.263 Instead, the risk is that a reaction to a
particularly unsympathetic defendant leads to a policy change that might
harm the majority of (powerless or socially marginalized) defendants.264
The critique of mens rea reform appears to operate in this register of
leveling up. The socially marginalized defendant doesn’t get the benefit of
the doubt—the argument goes—so why should the CEO? Senator
Warren’s Rigged Justice report raises this specter of a two-tiered system:
“If justice means a prison sentence for a teenager who steals a car, but it
means nothing more than a sideways glance at a CEO who quietly
engineers the theft of billions of dollars, then the promise of equal justice
under the law has turned into a lie.”265 Op-eds and editorials opposing
Imposed Despite the Jury’s Life Sentence (Aug. 13, 2018), https://eji.org/news/eji-
challenges-bobby-waldrop-death-sentence-by-judge-override [http://perma.cc/C783-
TNTW].
260 Gruber, supra note 190, at 1340–41.
261 See generally Levine, supra note 250; Kate Levine, Police Suspects, 116 COLUM. L.
REV. 1197, 1258 (2016).
262 See Levine, supra note 250, at 776.
263 See id.
264 See infra Part IV.C.
265 RIGGED JUSTICE, supra note 159, at 7. The move to analogize corporate conduct to
conventional criminality isn’t new and, historically, has been the province of more radical
leftist strands. See, e.g., Fredric Jameson, Reification and Utopia in Mass Culture, SOC.
TEXT, Winter 1979, at 130, 145 (1979):
546 LEVIN [Vol. 109
legislative action rely on similar rhetoric suggesting that mens rea reform
would allow wealth and power to shield defendants deserving of
punishment.266
Again, my claim is not that inequality based on the defendant’s
resources is defensible. Rather, my question is why should anyone be
treated the way disadvantaged defendants currently are? According to legal
historian James Whitman, the defining feature of U.S. criminal justice (as
opposed to the practices of France and Germany) is the treatment of “low
status” defendants.267 In Whitman’s account, France, Germany, and many
other European nations pursue an egalitarian commitment to “abolishing
historically low-status treatment.”268 The exceptional harshness of U.S.
criminal policy, by contrast, reflects what Whitman describes as a
commitment to “degradation”—all offenders should see their status reduced
and be degraded by punishment.269
Applying this analysis to the mens rea reform debates leads to a
troubling observation: it appears that the treatment of “low-status”
defendants is being treated as a fixed point by reform opponents. The
When indeed we reflect on an organized conspiracy against the public, one which
reaches into every corner of our daily lives and our political structures to exercise a
wanton ecocidal and genocidal violence at the behest of distant decision-makers and
in the name of an abstract conception of profit–surely [The Godfather] is not about
the Mafia, but rather about American business itself that we are thinking, American
capitalism in its most systematized and computerized, dehumanized, ‘multinational’
and corporate form. What kind of crime, said Brecht, is the robbing of a bank,
compared to the founding of a bank?
Id. Benjamin Levin, Made in the U.S.A.: Corporate Responsibility and Collective Identity in
the American Automotive Industry, 53 B.C. L. REV. 821, 850 (2012) (describing this theme
in radical narratives); Woody Guthrie, Pretty Boy Floyd, on Folkways: The Original Vision
(Smithsonian Folkways Records 1990) (“I’ve seen lots of funny men/Some will rob you
with a six-gun,/And some with a fountain pen.”). Notably, in many of these radical accounts,
the response to this inequality is not necessarily an appeal to have bankers or capitalists
prosecuted. Rather, it is to offer or ask for a deeper critique of capitalism and the social
structures that have empowered corrupt capitalists. See Levin, supra note 126, at 163–64.
266 See, e.g., Zach Carter, Opinion, House Bill Would Make It Harder To Prosecute
White-Collar Crime, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 16, 2015), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/
entry/white-collar-crime-prosecution_us_564a2336e4b06037734a2f84 [http://perma.cc/LEN
4-Z9EA]; Sam Sacks, Sen. Warren Shames GOP’s Criminal Justice “Reform” Proposals,
D.C. SENTINEL (Feb. 3, 2016), https://www.districtsentinel.com/sen-warren-shames-gops-
criminal-justice-reform-proposals/ [http://perma.cc/FL99-FJV4]; Don’t Change the Legal
Rule on Intent, supra note 133.
267 WHITMAN, supra note 130, at 9.
268 Id.
269 See id. at 7–10.
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“if . . . ” statement in Rigged Justice reads as though it’s rhetorical,270 but do
Senator Warren and other opponents of mens rea reform legislation actually
view the current treatment of teenagers in the system as just?271 For critics
of the criminal system who view the law as a means of reinforcing and
creating deep structural inequality,272 the idea that we can make things
better by further empowering prosecutors, further expanding criminal
liability, and further reducing the possible universe of criminal defenses is
puzzling at best and flat-out wrong at worst.273 Whether a rising tide of
criminal justice reform actually would lift all boats and benefit all
defendants is an empirical question,274 but, is ensuring that a rich defendant
is convicted (on the off chance he is prosecuted) really worth eliminating
the possibility that the poor defendant can raise a credible defense?275 If the
answer is “yes,” then we have a long way to go if the goal is ending mass
incarceration and dialing back the punitive state.
Further, and perhaps even more troubling, it is worth noting once
again that the mens rea reform proposals do not foreclose the possibility of
prosecuting and harshly punishing a range of corporate (or powerful)
actors.276 The proposals simply would require clearer legislative drafting.277
Even if this distinction is less significant as a practical matter than a formal
matter, it is important as a means of illustrating just how troubling the level
up move can be. Taken on its face, then, the opposition to mens rea reform
doesn’t rest on a claim that corporate crime should be punished or
270 See RIGGED JUSTICE, supra note 159, at 7 (“If justice means a prison sentence for a
teenager who steals a car”).
271 Cf. GARRETT, supra note 130, at 263–66 (comparing data on corporate prosecutions
to other types of prosecutions).
272 See generally Butler, supra note 232 (arguing that the criminal system is designed to
control poor people of color).
273 See Gruber, supra note 190, at 1383 (expressing concern that these sorts of equality
arguments “will lead to level-up solutions that render minority defendants vulnerable to
increased policing, prosecution, and incarceration”).
274 See supra note 251.
275 Cf. Aya Gruber, A Provocative Defense, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 332 (2015)
(making a similar argument in regard to the proposed elimination of the provocation
defense); Benjamin Levin, Note, A Defensible Defense?: Reexamining Castle Doctrine
Statutes, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 523, 552 (2010) (raising a similar argument in regard to the
castle doctrine).
276 See supra notes 233–235 and accompanying text.
277 See supra Part II. A. As I have noted throughout this Article, I do not mean to
discount the practical issues that would result from the passage of mens rea reform
legislation. At the very least, to the extent that drafters intended an otherwise-silent statute to
impose strict liability, Congress would need to go back and amend the statute.
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prosecuted as vigorously as non-white-collar crime.278 Instead, it rests on a
claim that prosecutors—with judicial assistance—should be able to enjoy
the much-criticized advantages that they enjoy in other corners of the
criminal practice.
One of the greatest concerns in the critical literature and case law on
the criminal system is that existing rules, politics, and practices, empower
prosecutors to take advantage of broadly drafted statutes to coerce
defendants into plea deals:279 “where the legislature
drafts broad criminal statutes and then attaches mandatory sentences to
those statutes, prosecutors have an unchecked opportunity to overcharge
and generate easy pleas, a form of strategic behavior that exacerbates the
structural deficiencies endemic to plea bargaining.”280 Indeed, in her
dissent in Yates v. United States, Justice Elena Kagan effectively endorses
this critique and suggests that it has driven the reasoning of her fellow
Justices.281 According to Justice Kagan, the statutory provision in question,
is an example of “overcriminalization and excessive punishment in the U.S.
Code.”282 It is “a bad law—too broad and undifferentiated, with too-high
maximum penalties, which give prosecutors too much leverage and
sentencers too much discretion.”283 Opponents of mens rea reform may not
have dismissed such concerns outright, but in their move to level up, they
appear to have concluded that such a dynamic is desirable, or at least
necessary, to serve equality-based ends.
C. CARCERAL EXCEPTIONALISM
Finally, the case of mens rea reform speaks to a related and, perhaps,
intractable problem: it is much easier to take a stand in favor of
decarceration and criminal justice reform when a given defendant does not
seem so bad or where criminal conduct doesn’t seem like such a big deal. It
becomes much harder when confronted with the bad defendant or the
278 See supra note 234.
279 See, e.g., Andrew Manuel Crespo, The Hidden Law of Plea Bargaining, 118 COLUM.
L. REV. 1303, 1311 (2018) (“[W]hile such an exchange may sound like an actual bargain,
with each party gaining, to quote the Supreme Court, a ‘mutuality of advantage’ from the
deal, most knowledgeable observers describe it as something else: a fundamentally coercive
practice (occasionally analogized to torture) that produces involuntary pleas, sometimes to
crimes the defendant did not commit.”) (footnote omitted); Hessick, supra note 78, at 1138.
280 Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining As Contract, 101 YALE
L.J. 1909, 1965 (1992).
281 Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1100 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
282 Id.
283 Id. at 1101; see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 727–34 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (critiquing excessive prosecutorial power).
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particularly troubling act. The impulse then becomes one of making
exceptions.284
Intuitively, this observation may appear straightforward, and the
impulse may be deeply human. But, in this final Section, I will suggest that
this impulse may help explain some of the deepest challenges in achieving
sweeping criminal justice reform and also in understanding some of the
ostensible inconsistency in views on the criminal system—particularly
among scholars and advocates on the left. Thinking of this phenomenon as
carceral exceptionalism (i.e., this defendant is exceptional and therefore
deserving of the full force of the carceral state)285 may provide a useful lens
through which to view the mens rea reform debates.
In a sense, carceral exceptionalism asks us to confront just how
sweeping critiques of the criminal system truly are and what critics are
worried about when they decry “mass incarceration” (or, for that matter,
“overcriminalization”). Is the problem a structural or phenomenological
284 See, e.g., FORMAN, supra note 12, at 221–22, 229 (critiquing a reformist impulse that
focuses only on “nonviolent offenders”); GOTTSCHALK, supra note 135, at 165–69
(criticizing as insufficient reform proposals targeted at “nonviolent, nonserious, nonsex
crimes”); Ristroph, supra note 196, at 621 (critiquing the line between violent and non-
violent crime and the overreliance on that line in crafting policy).
285 Or, more provocatively, carceral NIMBYism (i.e., I can support decarceration until
the harm or bad conduct by a defendant threatens me or my values). Such a frame becomes
particularly fitting when confronting situations that literally appear to involve progressive
commentators affirming their commitments to criminal justice reform or progressive causes
while suggesting that crime in their own neighborhoods must be dealt with swiftly and
harshly. See, e.g., David Kline et al., Portland Must Stand Up to Predators, OREGONIAN
(June 6, 2018), https://www.oregonlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2018/06/
portland_must_stand_up_to_pred.html?utm_source=The+Appeal&utm_campaign=6eba011
046&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_72df992d84-6eba011046-58393087
[http://perma.cc/3PQN-YLT3] (“Portlanders rightly take pride in their acceptance of all
lifestyles. But predatory criminal behavior is not an ‘alternative lifestyle.’ It’s a cancer on
the city and a threat to us all, and it’s time for the city to do something about it.”). This June
2018 op-ed in The Oregonian provides a striking example of this phenomenon. See id. The
authors note that they have “all worked in homeless advocacy or other progressive causes”
before embarking on a critique of “predatory homeless” people and “over-tolerant” policing
in the liberal mecca of Portland. Id. I don’t mean to diminish the impact of crime on
communities, but, one key mistake of the exceptionalist move is to assume that this one class
of crime or one class of defendants is somehow different—or, more pointedly, that many
other people don’t also experience the externalities of the effects of criminal conduct.
Accepting one of these narratives or arguments effectively opens the floor to others, inviting
an approach to criminal justice reform that either: (1) is remarkably narrow in scope,
focusing only on criminal conduct that manages to harm or offend almost no one; or (2) a
sort of elitist criminal justice reform that grants voice or veto power to victims or third
parties with political clout, but none to victims or third parties with no such influence.
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one about what punishment looks like and how it operates?286 Or, is the
problem one of calibration, where our concern is that the wrong people are
being punished and/or that the defendant deserving of punishment is being
punished too much?287 Elsewhere, I have characterized these two general
critical tendencies as the mass (structural) and over (calibration) approach
to criminal law scholarship and reform.288
For many critics on the political left, the language of criminal justice
reform sounds in a mass register via radical discourses of structural
inequality.289 But carceral exceptionalism shows that mass critiques often
belie over tendencies. Take the case of mens rea reform: liberal,
progressive, or left critics articulate a concern about racial and
socioeconomic inequality. The system is rigged. The system is corrupt.
And the system preys upon the weak and powerless. But what is the
system? That is, the critique sounds structural or phenomenological. But
the proposed solution (or, at least the objection to proposed legislation)
sounds in the discourse of further empowering prosecutors and the same
actors and institutions that have driven mass incarceration. As discussed
above, to the extent there is something fundamentally wrong with those
actors and institutions (e.g., their incentives; their politics; their biases),
why should we assume that those flaws will evaporate when they are
dealing with a bad defendant?290
286 See, e.g., Amna A. Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 405, 424 (2018) (advocating for interventions in the criminal system that “expand[] the
frame beyond police violence, and even criminal justice institutions, to the interlocking set
of current and historical systems that propel and draw from anti-Black racism”); Butler,
supra note 151, at 2183; Dorothy E. Roberts, Democratizing Criminal Law as an
Abolitionist Project, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1597, 1604–05 (2017) (“[Criminal legal]
institutions enforce an undemocratic racial caste system originating in slavery. Making
criminal law democratic, then, requires something far more radical than reducing bias or
increasing inclusion in this antidemocratic system. Democratizing criminal law requires
dismantling its anti-democratic aspects altogether and reconstituting the criminal justice
system without them.”).
287 See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 851 F.3d 666, 676 (7th Cir. 2017) (Posner, J.,
dissenting); Todd R. Clear, The Effects of High Imprisonment Rates on Communities, 37
CRIME & JUST. 97, 125 (2008) (“The problem of mass incarceration is entirely produced by
the simple mathematics of two pressure points–how many people enter prison and how long
they stay there.”); Timothy W. Floyd, Steven’s Choice, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 203, 203
(2012) (“Although prisons are a necessary evil, we imprison far too many people in our
society, and for far too long.”).
288 See generally Levin, supra note 1 (describing these two competing theories of “mass
incarceration” and criminal justice reform).
289 See supra notes 239–243 and accompanying text.
290 Cf. Benjamin Levin, Values and Assumptions in Criminal Adjudication, 129 HARV.
L. REV. F. 379, 380 (2016) (“To the extent our criminal justice system already suffers from
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Put simply, carceral exceptionalism rests on the belief not only that
certain crimes or defendants are exceptional, but also on the belief that the
line between the treatment of exceptional areas and “ordinary” crime can
hold. Despite the stated focus on distributive concerns that drives
opposition to mens rea reform and many other projects of
exceptionalism,291 exceptionalism tends to discount the distributional
realities of strengthening carceral institutions (as well as the ways in which
those institutions are embedded in a broader web of unequal social,
political, and economic structures).292 And, to many critics adopting a mass
frame, criminal policy is inextricable from social welfare policy and
distributional decisions central to U.S. political economy; regardless of the
distributional goals of a given prosecutorial project, such forces make it
extremely likely that harsher criminal policies inevitably will harm the least
powerful members of society.293 That is, if we adopt the (increasingly
common) view that the criminal system is inextricable from a deeply
flawed brand of social control, any move to give that system or its actors
more power risks exacerbating, or at least further entrenching, those
inequalities.
In the context of mens rea reform, the exception is the realm of white-
collar crime, where the state failure is one of underenforcement rather than
the assumptions and biases of judges and other official actors, granting those same actors the
ability to interpret a wealth of data or ‘facts’ need not dictate a move toward greater justice
or greater accuracy.”).
291 Examples include intimate-partner violence, sexual violence, hate crimes, and other
areas where the pro-criminalization position rests on empowering an otherwise
disempowered victim. See generally Aharonson, supra note 201.
292 See, e.g., Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN
SOCIOLOGY 77, 78 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., 2001) (“[T]he modern state is a
compulsory association which organizes domination. It has been successful in seeking to
monopolize the legitimate use of physical force as a means of domination within a
territory.”); White, supra note 142, at 786 (“Behind the façade of justifications, the criminal
justice system is an institution of social control oriented to the management of dysfunctions
inherent in capitalist society—unemployment, poverty, and the like.”).
293 See, e.g., STUART HALL ET AL., POLICING THE CRISIS: MUGGING, THE STATE, AND
LAW AND ORDER 192 (1978) (“[I]n a class society, based on the needs of capital and the
protection of private property, the poor and the propertyless are always in some sense on ‘the
wrong side of the law’, whether they actually transgress it or not . . . All crime control . . . is
an aspect of that larger and wider exercise of ‘social authority’; and in class societies that
will inevitably mean the social authority exerted by the powerful and the propertied over the
powerless and the propertyless.”); RUTH WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS,
SURPLUS, CRISIS, AND OPPOSITION IN GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA 85–86 (2007); NICOLA
LACEY, THE PRISONERS’ DILEMMA 170–73 (2008); WACQUANT, supra note 12, at 1–3;
Aziza Ahmed, Adjudicating Risk: AIDS, Crime, and Culpability, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 627,
630 (2016).
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overenforcement.294 Thinking back to Senator Warren’s rhetoric and the
language of the Occupy the SEC petition, white-collar defendants who
might benefit from mens rea reform are framed as the deserving targets of
state violence and prosecutorial attention. In other contexts, framing
procedural or structural protections for defendants as “loopholes” or
“technicalities” might be problematic—the province of a reactionary,
tough-on-crime right.295 But in this context, left critics have embraced the
rhetoric and positions of tough-on-crime politicians.296
Other examples of this phenomenon abound. As discussed above,
sexual assault and gender-based violence or sex crimes have remained areas
where scholars and advocates on the left have been vocal proponents of
expanding the scope and scale of criminal regulation.297 Almost twenty
years ago, Stuntz observed the exceptionality of sexual assault:
[C]riminal law’s breadth is old news. It has long been a source of academic
complaint; indeed, it has long been the starting point for virtually all the scholarship
in this field, which (with the important exception of sexual assault) consistently
argues that existing criminal liability rules are too broad and ought to be narrowed.298
Scholars, activists, and politicians who elsewhere decry mass
incarceration often support amping up criminal law when it comes to
294 Cf. RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW (1997) (tracing the
underenforcement of crimes against black defendants). But see Paul Butler, (Color) Blind
Faith: The Tragedy of Race, Crime, and the Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1270 (1998)
(critiquing the focus on underenforcement).
295 See generally Benjamin Levin, De-Naturalizing Criminal Law: Of Public
Perceptions and Procedural Protections, 76 ALA. L. REV. 1777 (2013) (describing the
relationship between this framing and the rise of “law and order” politics).
296 See Sacks, supra note 266 (quoting Senator Warren as stating on the Senate floor:
“To anyone in Congress who thinks they can simply talk tough on crime and then vote to
make it even harder to crack down on corporate criminals, hear this: I promise you–I
promise you–the American people are watching . . . And they will remember.”). Notably,
spokespeople for President Obama voiced these sentiments, appealing not just to concerns
about white-collar crime, but to fear of terrorism and other targets common in the parlance
of tough-on-crime politics. See Zach Carter, White House Comes Out Against Effort to Block
White-Collar Crime Prosecutions, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 19, 2015), at
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/white-collar-crime-white-house-
response_us_564dd06be4b00b7997f95240 [http://perma.cc/M6RS-6DZ7] (quoting a
Whitehouse spokesperson: “If the bill became law, a terrorist could only be found guilty for
using a weapon of mass destruction if he specifically knew his victims were going to be U.S.
nationals, a killer could only be found guilty of certain firearm crimes if he knew the gun
traveled in interstate commerce, and a white-collar criminal could only be found guilty of
bank fraud if he knew he was robbing a bank that was FDIC-insured”).
297 See supra notes 196–198 and accompanying text.
298 Stuntz, supra note 6102, at 507.
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addressing rape.299 There is a range of explanations for this exceptional
treatment including the historical undereneforcement of crimes against
women and power imbalances resulting from the institutional structures of
patriarchal society.300 But, regardless of the justification, the logic of
exceptionalism remains: these defendants are more deserving of
punishment than others, and procedural protections—rather than critical
components of a civil libertarian agenda—are impeding just outcomes.
This tendency to exceptionalize when presented with the specter of
more privileged defendants persists. In the context of hate crime
legislation, pro-criminalization proponents similarly argue that prosecutors
and the moral or expressive force of criminal law can help address
pervasive bigotry and victimization of minority defendants.301 Likewise,
commentators often claim that wealthier or politically-connected
299 See, e.g., John Ehrett, Public Choice and the Mandatory Minimum Temptation,
35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 603, 610 (2017) (describing the move to embrace mandatory
minimum prison sentences for rape in California); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Criminal Justice
and the Mattering of Lives, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1156–57 (2018) (critiquing
underenforcement of rape law and arguing that more robust enforcement should be a
component of criminal justice reform).
300 For historical work that both contributes to and complicates these narratives, see,
e.g., Carolyn B. Ramsey, Domestic Violence and State Intervention in the American West
and Australia, 1860-1930, 86 IND. L.J. 185 (2011); Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Exit Myth:
Family Law, Gender Roles, and Changing Attitudes Toward Female Victims of Domestic
Violence, 20 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1 (2013).
301 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 413, 462–63 (1999) (tracking debates about the application of hate crime statutes);
Muneer I. Ahmad, A Rage Shared by Law: Post-September 11 Racial Violence as Crimes of
Passion, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1294 (2004) (advocating for an expansive vision of “hate
crimes” to address violence against Muslim Americans and Arab Americans in the wake of
9/11); Paula C. Johnson, The Social Construction of Identity in Criminal Cases: Cinema
Verite and the Pedagogy of Vincent Chin, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 347, 486 (1996) (“Hate
crime legislation is an important effort toward the public approbation of bias-motivated
injuries, provided the necessary willingness by law enforcement agencies is forthcoming.”);
Frederick M. Lawrence, The Punishment of Hate: Toward A Normative Theory of Bias-
Motivated Crimes, 93 MICH. L. REV. 320, 381 (1994):
Bias crime laws ought to single out criminal conduct that is motivated by racial
animus. Discriminatory selection of a victim will ordinarily be part of racial animus.
Indeed, the proof of animus in the prosecution of a bias crime will likely begin with
evidence relating to victim selection. Elements of proof, however, must not be
confused with the gravamen of the crime. The gravamen of a bias crime is the animus
of the accused.
Id. But see ADLER, supra note 14 (critiquing this model of dealing with violence against
queer victims).
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defendants should receive harsher treatment.302 Similarly, as discussed
above, academics and activists frequently argue that police defendants
should receive fewer procedural protections than other defendants and/or
should be targeted for more aggressive prosecution.303 Outside of the mens
rea reform context, a range of scholars and advocates has argued that
aggressive prosecutorial approaches are appropriate in the context of white-
collar crime.304
To be clear, some expressions of carceral exceptionalism don’t rely on
a claim that structural issues won’t persist in a given case or context;
instead, the claim is that the benefits will outweigh the costs. That is, one
need not be an ardent supporter of incarceration as a solution in order to
believe that incarceration is the appropriate fit in a given instance.
Nevertheless, while the cost-benefit or distributional analysis is certainly a
better approach than simply disregarding structural problems, it still raises
some troubling questions and often appears to reflect some problematic
assumptions.
In the context of mens rea reform—and elsewhere—the move to
exceptionalize requires some sort of comparison or relative calculus.
Arguing that a given area is deserving of state violence and the attention of
the carceral apparatus while other areas (e.g., drug crime, “nonviolent”
302 See, e.g., Ehrett, supra note 299 (tracking the punitive response to the relatively short
sentence for sexual offenses committed by former Stanford University swimmer Brock
Turner); Aris Folley, Protesters Chant ‘Lock Him Up!’ as Manafort Headed into Court, THE
HILL (June 15, 2018), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/392486-protesters-
chant-lock-him-up-as-manafort-heads-into-court [http://perma.cc/D9E8-ARBV].
303 See supra notes 261–264 and accompanying text.
304 See, e.g., Terri Gerstein & David Seligman, A Response to “Rethinking Wage Theft
Criminalization”, ONLABOR (Apr. 20, 2018), https://onlabor.org/a-response-to-rethinking-
wage-theft-criminalization/ [http://perma.cc/9HQV-DJJ4] (arguing that prosecutors should
be trusted to exercise discretion appropriately in the context of wage theft cases and stating
that: “While we of course appreciate the deep structural flaws of our criminal justice system,
we’ve seen how important a tool the criminal law can be in protecting workers from wage
theft, and we don’t think that bringing the criminal law to bear on predatory employers who
take advantage of vulnerable workers exacerbates the injustices of our criminal justice
system.”); Terri Gerstein, Stealing From Workers Is a Crime. Why Don’t More Prosecutors
See It That Way?, THE NATION (May 24, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/stealing-
from-workers-is-a-crime-why-dont-prosecutors-see-it-that-way/ [http://perma.cc/4YLM-
R3JA] (arguing that criminal justice reform-oriented voters should vote to encourage more
aggressive prosecutions of white-collar crime). But see Ben Levin, Rethinking Wage Theft
Criminalization, ONLABOR (Apr. 13, 2018), https://onlabor.org/rethinking-wage-theft-
criminalization/ [http://perma.cc/2274-B2WD] (critiquing this argument); Ben Levin,
Prosecutorial Power, Prisons, and the Problem with Wage Theft Criminalization: A Reply,
ONLABOR (Apr. 30, 2018), https://onlabor.org/prosecutorial-power-prisons-and-the-
problem-with-wage-theft-criminalization-a-reply/ [http://perma.cc/6HFX-HYGB] (same).
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crime, etc.) are not requires implicit or explicit comparative work: this type
of conduct must be worse or more suited to criminal regulation and
penalties than those other areas. Perhaps the clearest case of carceral
exceptionalism is the treatment of “violent offenders” as it compares to the
treatment of “nonviolent offenders.” Across the political spectrum, it is
common to endorse criminal justice reform enthusiastically for “nonviolent
offenders,” while supporting continued harsh treatment (and even
increasing the harsh treatment) of “violent offenders.”305 Never mind that
the majority of people incarcerated are serving time for violent crime or that
the line between “violent” and “nonviolent” crime may be surprisingly
difficult to draw.306 The exceptional turn allows for commentators to
support criminal justice reform vociferously while drawing the line at
conduct that sounds “bad,” thus perpetuating the myth that mass
incarceration is the result of incarcerating too many “nonviolent drug
offenders.”307
That line drawing exercise and the allure of retrenching on “violent
crime” should cause concern when it comes to mens rea reform opposition
and the desire to make corporate or regulatory crime the exceptions worthy
of harsh treatment. In other words, if mens rea reform opponents are
claiming that white-collar crime is uniquely deserving of unrestrained
prosecutorial power and expansive statutes, logic would dictate that they
are claiming that this area of crime is somehow worse or more harmful than
other areas. That might be a defensible position—from a left,
redistributionist perspective, the crimes of capital might be far worse than
the crimes of individuals robbed of choice and opportunity by social
inequality;308 alternatively, as a matter of scale, we might view the harms
caused by widespread environmental degradation or economic
manipulation as more widely shared than the harms caused by most
instances of violent interpersonal conduct.309
305 See, e.g., GOTTSCHALK, supra note 135, at 165–69 (critiquing this position);
FORMAN, supra note 12, at 221–22 (same); PFAFF, supra note 35, at 8 (same).
306 See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (debating the meaning of
“violence”); PFAFF, supra note 35, at 15–16, 21 (collecting prison data); Ristroph, supra
note 196 (describing the fuzzy line between violent and nonviolent crime).
307 See generally PFAFF, supra note 35 (critiquing this flawed “standard story” of
criminal justice reform).
308 Cf. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Marxism and Retributivism, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 217 (1973)
(arguing that pervasive inequality undermines the logic of retributivism).
309 See, e.g., ANDREW HACKER, THE NEW YORKERS: A PROFILE OF AN AMERICAN
METROPOLIS 107 (1975):
In all probability, muggers take much less from individuals than do corporate . . . and
white-collar criminals. Many executives swindle more on their taxes and expense
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It’s important to recognize, however, that these arguments can be
problematic, 310 particularly when the point of comparison is violent crime,
or, even more so when it’s violent crime committed against marginalized or
powerless defendants. For scholars and commentators who are comfortable
with the current treatment of “violent” offenders, the challenge of proving
this comparative point might matter little. But, for those seeking change,
these arguments should be worrying. Unless the sorts of regulatory offense
at stake here are viewed as worse than “violent crime,” it would be difficult
to make a case for reducing prosecutorial power and punitive approaches to
violence.311
The literature on prison abolitionism speaks of “the dangerous few,” a
group of individuals who still might need to be detained or have their
liberty restricted in even the most heavily decarcerated society.312 Even if
society were to reject incarceration wholesale, the argument goes, some
individuals might continue to pose an intolerable risk. From a radical
decarceration or abolitionist perspective, then, embracing the arguments of
Senator Warren and other mens rea reform opponents would require
accepting that defendants who (perhaps unknowingly) commit economic,
environmental, or regulatory crimes are the true “dangerous few.” That
may be a defensible position, but it’s important to recognize how
challenging it would be theoretically—and politically—to take this position
while arguing for non-carceral solutions to violent crime or non-carceral
treatment of individuals with a long history of violent crimes.313
accounts than the average addict steals in a year. Unfortunately, concentrating on
street crime provides yet another opportunity for picking on the poor.
Id.
310 Cf. Stuart P. Green & Matthew B. Kugler, Public Perceptions of White Collar Crime
Culpability: Bribery, Perjury, and Fraud, 75 LAW & CONTEM. PROBS. 33, 33 (2012):
We are accustomed to thinking of ‘crime’ as involving the most blameworthy and
antisocial sorts of conduct in which citizens can engage, conduct that is clearly and
unambiguously more wrongful than conduct that is not criminal. But the reality is
more complex, especially when we look at certain kinds of ‘white collar’ behavior.
Id.
311 See Levin, supra note 304.
312 See, e.g., Liat Ben-Moshe, The Tension Between Abolition and Reform, in THE END
OF PRISONS: REFLECTIONS FROM THE DECARCERATION MOVEMENT 90 (Mechthild E.
Nagel & Anthony J. Nocella II eds., 2013); Jim Thomas and Sharon Boehlefeld, Rethinking
Abolitionism: What Do We Do With Henry?, in WE WHO WOULD TAKE NO PRISONERS:
SELECTIONS FROM THE FIFTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PENAL ABOLITION (Brian
Maclean & Harold Pepinsky eds., 1993); McLeod, supra note 251, at 1171.
313 For a fascinating examination of the “dangerous few” and the harms of white-collar
criminality, see Thomas Frampton, The Dangerous Few (unpublished manuscript; draft on
file with author).
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None of this is to downplay the challenge of applying the decarceral
approach to situations that seem particularly bad or to defendants who seem
particularly unsympathetic. (To be clear, one explanation for the
prevalence of carceral exceptionalism is a resistance or inability to
recognize that much criminal conduct has third-party harm.) Rather, it is to
say that a truly transformative criminal justice reform movement will
require us to stop making exceptions.314 A model of criminal justice reform
that only helps the truly innocent defendants or that strives for
decriminalization and decarceration only for clearly harmless conduct
cannot possibly do major work in reducing our massive prison
populations.315 Indeed, one of the biggest insights of Forman’s Pulitzer-
Prize-winning book, Locking Up Our Own is to stress that crime (and
particularly drug-related crime) was a serious problem in many black
communities at the dawn of the War on Crime. 316 But, as Forman argues,
recognizing that crime is a problem and that there are real victims—often
victims from marginalized communities—does not diminish the lessons of
the War on Drugs and the War on Crime that the social costs of a criminal
model of regulation can be devastating.317 A comprehensive criminal
justice reform agenda will require acknowledging the harms of criminal
conduct while recognizing the problems with using the carceral solutions.
This may be an unwelcome suggestion or it might push further than
some opponents of mens rea reform would want to go: it is not indefensible
to oppose some of the worst excesses of the carceral state, but still support
some forms of harsh criminal punishment.318 Indeed, this is a position that
appears to be widely shared by many criminal justice reformers.319 But, for
those who articulate a stronger or more radical critique—a critique that
calls for a reckoning with the way society treats violent crime, or pushes for
a broader move away from criminal law as a solution—it is important to
resist the punitive impulse when it is our ox that is being gored.
314 See, e.g., FORMAN, supra note 12, at 221; GOTTSCHALK, supra note 135, at 165–69.
315 See generally PFAFF, supra note 35.
316 See generally FORMAN, supra note 12.
317 See generally FORMAN, supra note 12; see also AFTER THE WAR ON CRIME: RACE,
DEMOCRACY, AND A NEW RECONSTRUCTION (Mary Louise Frampton, et al., eds. 2008)
(describing the consequences of those criminal models of regulation).
318 To be clear, rejecting any exceptionalism might well lead to an abolitionist stance not
necessarily shared by many of the critics and commentators. Or, at least, it might require
scholars to hone in on points of logical or theoretical inconsistency in their critiques of the
criminal system.
319 See Levin, supra note 1, at 265–74 (describing this approach as one of the two
primary impulses in criminal justice reform).
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CONCLUSION
Ultimately, there may be many reasons to be skeptical about mens rea
reform legislation and its politics. Nevertheless, as I have argued,
opposition to mens rea reform spells trouble for the future of criminal
justice reform. The debates over these legislative proposals raise important
questions about the limits of bipartisanship and the interaction of criminal
law with other regulatory enterprises. But, they should also force us to
confront the continuing lure of criminal punishment and the belief that
more punishment is the way to tackle social problems or discipline deviant
actors. That siren song has helped build the carceral state. Dismantling it
will require resisting those calls.
